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        Paul H. Schafhauser (argued)  
         Berger & Bornstein  
         237 South Street  
         P.O. Box 2049  
         Morristown, N.J. 07960-2049  
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        Kenneth H. Mack (argued)  
         Linda Mack  
         Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel  
         997 Lenox Drive  
         Princeton Pike Corporate Center,  
         Building 3  
         Lawrenceville, N.J. 08648  
    
         Attorneys for Appellees  
    
 OPINION OF THE COURT  
    
 GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.  
    
 I. INTRODUCTION  
    
 This matter comes before this court on an appeal by  
  plaintiffs United States Land Resources, L.P. ("USLR"),  
  United States Realty Resources, Inc. ("USRR"), Black Horse  
  Lane Associates, L.P. ("Black Horse"), and Lawrence S.  
  Berger ("Berger") (collectively "appellants") from two orders  
  entered by the district court in this matter: (1) the order  
  entered August 10, 1999, granting a motion by appellees  
  Dow Chemical Corporation ("Dow") and Essex Chemical  
  Corporation ("Essex") for summary judgment pursuant to  
  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, and denying appellants' cross-motion for  
  summary judgment on appellees' counterclaim; and (2) the  
  "Final Order" entered December 16, 1999, affirming the  
  June 30, 1999 order of the magistrate judge imposing  
  sanctions against appellants, and dismissing appellees'  
  counterclaim without prejudice for lack of subject matter  
  jurisdiction. This litigation arises out of a sale of  
  environmentally distressed real property located at 120  
  Black Horse Lane, South Brunswick, New Jersey  
  (hereinafter "the Property"), by Essex to USLR.  
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 For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the August 10,  
  1999 and December 16, 1999 orders of the district court in  
  all respects.  
    
 II. FACTS and PROCEEDINGS  
    
 A. Factual Background  
    
 The historical facts in this case are rather straightforward  
  and, insofar as material to this appeal, essentially are not  
  disputed. Appellants, USLR, USRR, Black Horse, and  
  Berger, are related entities: USLR is the general partner in  
  Black Horse, USRR is the general partner of USLR, and  
  Berger is the president of USRR.1 Appellees Essex and Dow  
  also are related entities as Essex is Dow's wholly-owned  
  subsidiary by virtue of its purchase of all of Essex's stock  
  in 1988.  
    
 During the 1980s, Essex owned and operated the  
  Property, where it engaged in the business of preparing  
  adhesive-backed paper products. On or about August 17,  
  1984, Essex discovered that chemicals it used in that  
  process had leaked into the ground of the Property. In  
  October 1984, Essex entered into environmental cleanup  
  and decommission negotiations with the New Jersey  
  Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP"). Essex  
  submitted a "Clean-Up Plan" to the DEP on December 19,  
  1985, which the DEP conditionally approved on December  
  20, 1985.  
    
 Prior to Essex's submission of the Clean-Up Plan to the  
  DEP, it entered into a sales agreement ("the Agreement") on  
  September 5, 1985, with USLR to sell the Property to USLR  
  for $3.6 million. The parties do not dispute that appellants  
  were aware of the Property's environmental problems at the  
  time that USLR and Essex entered into the Agreement. The  
  Agreement required Essex to obtain and implement an  
  approved Clean-Up Plan at its sole expense. Paragraph 16  
  of the Agreement set forth Essex's responsibilities with  
  _________________________________________________________________  
    
 1. Also, Berger is a named partner in the lawfirm representing  
  appellants.  
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 respect to the remediation and detoxification of the  
  Property:  
    
        The parties acknowledge that the Subject Premises to  
         be conveyed are subject to the provisions of the  
         Environmental Clean-Up Responsibility Act, N.J.S.A.  
         13:1K-6 et seq. (`ECRA') [now named the Industrial Site  
         Recovery Act (`ISRA')]. Seller agrees to obtain approval  
         of a Clean-Up Plan from the Department of  
         Environmental Protection (`DEP'), post the necessary  
         financial security for performance pursuant to ECRA,  
         will implement the approved Clean-Up Plan and  
         complete the detoxification of the Subject Premises in  
         accordance with and to the approval of the DEP.  
         Pending DEP approval of a Clean-Up Plan, Seller will  
         attempt to obtain the consent of the DEP to the  
         conveyance of the Subject Premises. `ECRA Approval'  
         will be deemed to have taken place upon the receipt by  
         Seller from the DEP of the approval of the  
         implementation of the Clean-Up Plan and satisfactory  
         detoxification of the Subject Premises or a consent  
         from the DEP to convey the Subject Premises to  
         Purchaser in the form of an Administrative Consent  
         Order and bond securing the detoxification of the  
         Subject Premises by Seller, all in a form and substance  
         satisfactory to Purchaser's mortgage lender. In no event  
         shall Purchaser be obligated under this Contract to  
         assume any ECRA Clean-Up responsibilities. If ECRA  
         Approval is not obtained prior to January 1, 1986,  
         Purchaser shall have the continuing right to terminate  
         this Contract by giving Seller notice at any time up to  
         January 20, 1986. If ECRA Approval is not obtained by  
         June 1, 1986, this Contract shall be automatically  
         terminated and after the refund of the Deposit to  
         Purchaser, neither party shall have any rights or  
         claims against the other arising out of this Contract.  
    
 App. at 93a-94a. Title to the Property closed on December  
  23, 1985, three days after the DEP conditionally approved  
  the Clean-Up Plan, and on that day USLR assigned its  
  rights in the Property to its present owner, appellant Black  
  Horse.  
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 As previously mentioned, at some point in 1988, appellee  
  Dow purchased all of Essex's stock, and Essex became a  
  wholly-owned subsidiary of Dow. Since that time, Dow  
  employees have been involved in the remediation and  
  detoxification of the Property, but these Dow employees  
  have been acting as "consultants" to Essex in that  
  connection. SA at 546, 549.  
    
 Essex began its soil remediation efforts shortly after it  
  sold the Property in 1985. While we are not able to  
  ascertain the exact date of completion from the record,  
  appellants' counsel confirmed at oral argument that soil  
  remediation was finished within two years of the sale of the  
  Property. See generally app. at 235a; SA at 536; appellees'  
  br. at 17. Essex commenced groundwater remediation in  
  1988, app. at 236a, but, to date, it has not completed that  
  remediation. It is Essex's alleged failure to complete  
  remediation and detoxification of the Property within a  
  "reasonable time" that forms the crux of the parties' dispute  
  in this case.  
    
 One specific example that appellants cite as proof of  
  Essex's alleged failure to remediate the Property within a  
  reasonable time pertains to Essex's cleanup efforts with  
  respect to certain "chlorinated volatile organic compounds"  
  ("CVOCs") found in the soil and groundwater in certain  
  areas of the Property.2 In 1991, the DEP ordered Essex to  
  perform a "temporary well point survey" to investigate the  
  presence and source of CVOCs found in the groundwater  
  and soil gas. See app. at 304a. After Essex conducted  
  extensive investigations into the source and levels of  
  CVOCs found in the soil gas and groundwater, Essex  
  proposed to remediate the areas of the Property  
  contaminated with CVOCs by means of soil vapor  
  _________________________________________________________________  
    
 2. "CVOCs" is a shorthand reference to those volatile organic compounds  
  that Essex used to clean the plant's adhesive-backed paper rolls.  
  The CVOCs found on the northeastern and eastern portions of  
  the Property include tetrachloroethylene, trichloroethylene, trans-1,2-  
  dichloroethylene, and vinyl chloride. App. at 237a. Essex discovered  
  trace amounts of CVOCs on the eastern and northeast corners of the  
  Property in 1985, but the concentrations were so low that at that time  
  DEP did not require Essex to address them. See  appellees' br. at 19;  
  App. at 200a, 237a; SA at 553.  
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 extraction ("SVE") technology, specifically, a "dual phase  
  extraction system." App. at 307a. In May 1992, DEP  
  approved this proposal. App. at 307a, 240a.  
    
 Notwithstanding DEP's approval of Essex's proposed  
  system, Essex did not begin to install and operate the  
  system immediately. Rather, from 1992 to 1997, Essex  
  continued to investigate the source of the various CVOCs  
  found on the Property, and conducted various tests at  
  DEP's request. See app. at 238a-40a. This additional  
  investigation required Essex to modify the SVE design,  
  which requirement might account for the delay in its  
  installation. App. at 240a. In any event, Essex completed  
  its installation of the dual-phase extraction system in  
  August 1997. We note, however, that Essex experienced  
  some "start up" difficulties at the outset of its operation of  
  the system. App. at 240a. Insofar as we can determine from  
  the record, Essex is continuing its remediation efforts in  
  connection with the CVOCs detected on the Property.  
    
 B. Procedural History  
    
 Appellants commenced this action in the district court in  
  1997, and filed an amended complaint shortly thereafter.  
  The amended complaint sets forth five causes of action  
  against appellees Essex and Dow:3 (1) a claim based on a  
  breach of Paragraph 16 of the sales contract as a result of  
  Essex's failure to complete its cleanup of the Property  
  within a "reasonable time", (count I);4 (2) a claim based on  
  a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair  
  dealing based on "defendants' " actions in connection with  
  their cleanup efforts, (count II); (3) a claim for damages  
  pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B) of the Comprehensive  
  Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act  
  ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. S 9607(a)(4)(B), based on appellants'  
  alleged expenditure of "necessary costs of response," and  
  _________________________________________________________________  
    
 3. Inasmuch as the amended complaint refers to Essex and Dow  
  collectively as "defendants" and asserts allfive claims against each  
  entity, we refer to the defendants together as "appellees" unless  
  otherwise noted.  
    
 4. The count does not use the term "reasonable time" but appellants  
  contend that a reasonable time provision is implicit in the Agreement.  
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 for declaratory and injunctive relief, (count III); (4) a claim  
  for contribution for the costs of "clean-up and removal" and  
  for injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to the New  
  Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. Stat. Ann.  
  S 58:10-23.11 et seq. ("the Spill Act"), (count IV); and (5) a  
  claim for "damages" based on appellees' breach of the  
  Agreement "as well as the contamination with respect to the  
  subject Property for which defendants are responsible,"  
  (count V). See app. at 67a. Appellees filed an answer to the  
  amended complaint and a counterclaim seeking declaratory  
  relief that remediation of the Property under Paragraph 16  
  of the Agreement included use of "engineering and  
  institutional controls" and an order requiring appellants to  
  consent to them. App. at 80a-81a.  
    
 The parties commenced discovery on November 7, 1997.  
  Appellants designated Berger as their Fed. R. Civ. P.  
  30(b)(6) witness to testify on behalf of USLR, USRR and  
  Black Horse. On October 2, 1998, appellees' counsel began  
  to depose Berger, but counsel was not able to obtain a date  
  to reconvene the deposition. As a result of counsels'  
  inability to agree on the date that Berger's deposition  
  should resume, appellees' counsel sought an order from the  
  magistrate judge overseeing discovery to set the date for the  
  resumption of the deposition. After a teleconference with  
  the parties on October 6, 1998, the magistrate judge signed  
  an order dated October, 9, 1998, which provided the  
  following:  
    
        IT IS on this 9th day of October, 1998, ORDERED, as  
         follows:  
    
        1. Lawrence S. Berger, as Plaintiffs' Fed. R. Civ. P.  
         30(b)(6) designated witness and fact witness, shall  
         appear for oral deposition commencing on Tuesday,  
         October 13, 1998, at 10:00 a.m. and continuing from  
         day to day thereafter until completed.  
    
 App. at 657a.  
    
 Notwithstanding the court's directive, when appellees'  
  counsel appeared at Berger's law office to continue his  
  deposition on October 13, 1998, Berger failed to appear and  
  his counsel, Paul Schafhauser, was "in trial" and not in the  
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 office. SA at 60-61. At that point, appellees' counsel again  
  sought the court's intervention.  
    
 On October 15, 1998, the magistrate judge signed and  
  entered an order which directed that Berger's deposition  
  recommence on Monday, October 19, 1998, at 10:00 a.m.  
  App. at 660a. The order also provided that "[a]s a sanction  
  for failure by Lawrence Berger to appear for depositions on  
  Tuesday, October 13, Plaintiffs shall promptly pay the fees  
  and costs of counsel fees for defendants (a) for appearing at  
  Mr. Berger's non-deposition on October 13, and (b) for  
  bringing this application and appearance today." App. at  
  660a. While Berger appeared for his deposition at the  
  designated date and time, appellees claim that he provided  
  evasive and non-responsive answers to many of counsel's  
  questions relating to the negotiation and execution of the  
  Agreement, and appellants' damages allegations. See  
  generally app. at 540a-655a.  
    
 After the completion of discovery, the parties filed several  
  motions germane to this appeal. First, appelleesfiled a  
  motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.  
  56, seeking dismissal of the amended complaint in its  
  entirety. Appellants opposed the motion, and filed a cross-  
  motion for summary judgment on appellees' counterclaim  
  for declaratory relief. In addition, appellees filed a motion  
  before the magistrate judge for discovery sanctions  
  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b), (d), seeking to preclude  
  appellants "from asserting, at trial, a position which differs  
  from the testimony of their Rule 30(b)(6) witness." App. at  
  20a. Appellees also sought reimbursement of the attorney's  
  fees and costs associated with Berger's deposition and their  
  filing of the second sanctions motion.  
    
 The magistrate judge granted appellees' request for  
  sanctions pursuant to Rule 37 by letter opinion and order  
  entered June 30, 1999. Relying on Rule 37(b) and (d), he  
  agreed that Berger's conduct warranted the sanction  
  appellees requested, namely that appellants would be  
  precluded from asserting a position and introducing  
  evidence contrary to the positions Berger asserted during  
  his deposition. The court also concluded that Berger's lack  
  of preparedness at his deposition warranted the imposition  
  of monetary sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(d) in the form of  
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 costs and attorney's fees associated with taking the  
  deposition and bringing the sanctions motion before the  
  court. App. at 22a. Appellants filed an appeal from the  
  magistrate judge's order to the district court.  
    
 In the meantime, after hearing oral argument on the  
  cross-motions for summary judgment on June 28, 1999,  
  see app. at 806a-831a, the district court granted appellees'  
  motion on the amended complaint and denied appellants'  
  cross-motion on the counterclaim by letter opinion and  
  order entered August 10, 1999. Addressing appellees'  
  motion first, the district court determined that dismissal of  
  the amended complaint in its entirety was appropriate for  
  several reasons, each of which we will discuss in greater  
  detail in the discussion that follows.5  
    
 With respect to the breach of contract claim (count I), the  
  court held that Paragraph 16 of the Agreement did not  
  contain a provision requiring Essex to remediate the  
  Property in a "reasonable time," and, given the commercial  
  context in which the parties negotiated and executed the  
  Agreement and appellants' subsequent conduct, the court  
  should not imply that the contract had a reasonable time  
  provision. See app. at 10a. Alternatively, it stated that even  
  if it were to assume that there is an implicit "reasonable  
  time" provision in Paragraph 16 of the Agreement,  
  _________________________________________________________________  
    
 5. Before engaging in a substantive analysis of appellants' claims 
against  
  Essex, the district court dismissed with prejudice all claims appellants  
  asserted against Dow, reasoning that  
    
        (1) plaintiffs' causes of action arise solely out of plaintiffs'  
         contractual relationship with defendant Essex; (2) Dow and Essex  
         are not related except to the extent that Dow acquired Essex's  
  stock;  
         (3) Essex is a responsible party and not insolvent; and (4) there  
  is  
         not even a scintilla of evidence that would justify piercing  
  Essex's  
         corporate veil.  
    
 App. at 7a n.1. Appellants assert that the district court erred in  
  dismissing outright the claims against Dow, claiming that there are  
  factual issues concerning whether it is a proper party in this suit. We  
  will affirm the court's dismissal of Dow without further discussion as  
  appellants' argument clearly is without merit. In any event, our  
  affirmance of the summary judgment for Essex means that Dow cannot  
  be liable to appellants.  
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 appellants failed to adduce any evidence from which a  
  reasonable jury could conclude that 14 years, i.e., from  
  1985 to the date of the district court's decision, was an  
  unreasonably long time period to complete the type of  
  detoxification and remediation called for in the Clean-Up  
  Plan. App. at 11a. Turning next to appellants' claim based  
  on the alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith  
  and fair dealing (count II), the court found that appellants  
  failed to produce sufficient evidence that Essex acted in bad  
  faith or engaged in misconduct that caused the delay in  
  completing the cleanup of the Property. App. at 13a.  
    
 Third, the court dismissed the CERCLA and Spill Act  
  claims for damages on the ground that appellants could not  
  demonstrate that they incurred any compensable costs  
  under either statute. The court pointed out that the only  
  costs that appellants allegedly incurred were the fees they  
  paid to their consultant, Enviro-Sciences, Inc. ("ESI"), but  
  that such fees were not compensable under either the  
  CERCLA or the Spill Act. App. at 15a. The court also denied  
  appellants' request for injunctive and declaratory relief  
  under CERCLA and the Spill Act, reasoning that  
  declaratory relief was inappropriate because "plaintiffs have  
  utterly failed to make any showing that they are likely to  
  incur any future costs that will be recoverable" under either  
  statute. It further found that injunctive relief was not  
  warranted in view of the circumstance that Essex"is  
  contractually and statutorily bound to detoxify the  
  Property," and there was no evidence that Essex had  
  breached the contract or violated CERCLA or the Spill Act.  
  App. at 15a-16a. Next, the court dismissed count V, stating  
  that "because plaintiffs have failed to adduce sufficient  
  evidence in support of their breach of contract claims, they  
  cannot recover the damages outlined in Count Five of the  
  Complaint." App. at 16a.  
    
 Finally, the district court addressed and denied  
  appellants' cross-motion for summary judgment on the  
  counterclaim, noting that appellants "cite no authority in  
  support of their motion," but "merely allege that `Plaintiffs  
  do not and need not consent to any [engineering and  
  institutional controls] with respect to the Property.' "  
  Ultimately the court found that "[o]n the present record,  
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 this Court is unable to say that the plaintiffs are entitled,  
  as a matter of law, to a judgment dismissing defendants'  
  counterclaims."6 App. at 17a. The court's order stated that  
  appellants' amended complaint was dismissed with  
  prejudice.  
    
 After the district court ruled on the parties' dispositive  
  motions, on or about August 13, 1999, the district court  
  ordered the parties to file cross-motions with respect to  
  Essex's counterclaim. App. at 775a. On December 13,  
  1999, the district court heard oral argument on the cross-  
  motions, and also considered appellants' outstanding  
  appeal from the magistrate judge's sanctions order. Ruling  
  on the outstanding motions the district court (1) affirmed  
  the magistrate judge's sanctions order, and (2) dismissed  
  Essex's counterclaim against appellants without prejudice  
  for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the  
  controversy set forth in the counterclaim was not ripe. See  
  app. at 832a-49a. The district court then memorialized its  
  record rulings in its "Final Order" entered December 16,  
  1999. App. at 23a. The monetary sanctions have been  
  quantified and we understand that appellants have paid  
  them.  
    
 Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal to this court  
  from the district court's orders of August 10, 1999, and  
  December 16, 1999. App. at 34a. The appellees do not  
  cross-appeal from the dismissal of their counterclaim. We  
  have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291.7 Of course,  
  the fact that the dismissal of the counterclaim was without  
  _________________________________________________________________  
    
 6. The court also addressed and denied appellees' motion for sanctions  
  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. That aspect of the court's ruling is not  
  in issue in this appeal, and we need not address it any further.  
    
 7. The district court exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 
28  
  U.S.C. S 1331 inasmuch as count III of the amended complaint asserted  
  a claim pursuant to CERCLA. The district court exercised supplemental  
  jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
  S 1367. We exercise plenary review over the district court's dismissal 
of  
  appellants' amended complaint and the counterclaim, see Nelson v.  
  Upsala College, 51 F.3d 383, 385 (3d Cir. 1995), and review the court's  
  disposition of the sanctions issue pursuant to Rule 37 for an abuse of  
  discretion. See General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Eastern Consol. Utils. Inc.,  
  126  
  F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 1997).  
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 prejudice does not in the circumstances here deprive us of  
  jurisdiction. See Presbytery of N.J. v. Florio , 40 F.3d 1454,  
  1461 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Erie County Retirees Ass'n v.  
  County of Erie, 220 F.3d 193, 202 (3d Cir. 2000).  
    
 III. DISCUSSION  
    
 As is evident from our recitation of the procedural history  
  leading to this appeal, appellants challenge several of the  
  district court's rulings made during the proceedings in this  
  matter. First, we will address the court's August 10, 1999  
  order dismissing the amended complaint. Then, we will  
  review the district court's December 16, 1999 order  
  dismissing appellees' counterclaim without prejudice, and  
  affirming the magistrate judge's sanctions order.  
    
 A. District Court's Dismissal of  
         the Amended Complaint  
    
 1. Breach of Contract Claim (Count I)  
    
 Appellants focus most of their attention on the district  
  court's dismissal of their breach of contract claim pleaded  
  in count I of the amended complaint. While recognizing that  
  under New Jersey law, courts generally find that there is a  
  "reasonable time" term implicit in contracts that do not set  
  forth any time limitation for performance, the district court  
  nevertheless held that "[i]n this case, the Court finds no  
  justification for implying a `reasonable time' for  
  performance because such a term is not `necessary to give  
  business efficacy to the contract as written.' " App. at 8a.  
  The court explained that "[a] main purpose of the  
  Agreement, and the only purpose of Paragraph 16, was to  
  require Essex to remediate the Property to the full  
  satisfaction of the DEP and thereby make the land freely  
  marketable." App. at 8a. The court found that"a  
  `reasonable time' limitation is not necessary because  
  Essex's performance under the contract--obtainingfinal  
  DEP approval--must be evaluated solely by reference to the  
  DEP." App. at 9a. Accordingly, the court stated that "such  
  a contract simply does not lend itself to a reasonable time  
  limitation." Id.  
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 It also dismissed the breach of contract claim on the  
  alternative ground that appellants presented insufficient  
  evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that  
  Essex breached its obligation to perform remediation and  
  obtain DEP approval pursuant to the Clean-Up Plan within  
  a "reasonable time." On this point, the district court held as  
  follows:  
    
        Plaintiffs allege that Essex has breached its contractual  
         obligation to complete the detoxification and obtain  
         final DEP approval `within a reasonable time.'  
         Therefore, to prevail, plaintiffs must show that a  
         `reasonable time' has already expired. The Agreement  
         was executed in 1985. This Court cannot say that  
         fourteen years is unreasonable as a matter of law. In  
         the context of an ISRA clean-up, which plaintiff Berger  
         understood to be a `cumbersome' and `long' process,  
         plaintiffs must adduce evidence that a `reasonable time'  
         for completion of the clean-up is less then fourteen  
         years. . . .  
    
         Such evidence might be in the form of reprimands or  
         other statements from regulatory agencies like the  
         DEP. Plaintiffs might also carry their evidentiary  
         burden with expert testimony that, under the  
         circumstances of this site and comparing it to other  
         sites, fourteen years is an unreasonable length of time.  
         In this case, however, plaintiffs have simply failed to  
         adduce any evidence that fourteen years is  
         unreasonable. The only evidence that even remotely  
         addresses this issue is contained in plaintiffs' expert  
         report. . . .  
    
         Giving plaintiffs the best of Mr. Cohen's report, `the  
         environmental program undertaken on this site has  
         been slow and ineffective in treating the contaminants  
         that were release by Essex Chemical.' But evidence of  
         a slow and ineffective clean-up process, without more,  
         cannot reasonably support an inference that fourteen  
         years is unreasonable.  
    
 App. at 11a-12a.  
    
 Appellants contend that the court erred in dismissing  
  their breach of contract claim because, notwithstanding the  
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 absence in Paragraph 16 of the Agreement of an explicit  
  date by which Essex was to complete its cleanup of the  
  Property and obtain DEP approval, by implication the  
  Agreement requires Essex to fulfill its contractual  
  obligations within a reasonable time. Appellants rely on the  
  well-established principle of New Jersey law, which is  
  applicable here on the contractual issues, that" `[w]here no  
  time is fixed for the performance of a contract, by  
  implication a reasonable time was intended.' " Br. at 41  
  (quoting, inter alia, Becker v. Sunrise at Elkridge, 543 A.2d  
  977, 983 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988)). They claim that  
  the district court erred in concluding that the nature of this  
  particular contract, and Essex's obligation with respect to  
  the remediation of the Property, rendered a "reasonable  
  time" limitation unreasonable in the circumstances.  
  Alternatively, they assert that at a minimum, there was a  
  genuine issue of material fact as to whether the parties  
  intended that Essex complete its remediation obligations  
  within a reasonable time, thus precluding summary  
  judgment in appellees' favor. Second, appellants contend  
  that contrary to the district court's finding, they presented  
  sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could  
  conclude that Essex failed to remediate the Property within  
  a "reasonable time."  
    
 Appellees respond that the district court correctly  
  dismissed the breach of contract claim because appellants  
  base their argument on the incorrect premise that  
  Paragraph 16 omits a contractual provision which in turn  
  requires the court to supply a "reasonable time" limitation.  
  Br. at 36. They claim that contrary to appellants'  
  construction of the contract, Paragraph 16 does contain a  
  definite term for completion of the Property's remediation  
  and therefore does not omit a contractual provision. In  
  appellees' view the contract unambiguously provides the  
  only term for completion that is reasonable in the  
  circumstances--namely, that Essex's obligation is satisfied  
  if the detoxification is undertaken "in accordance with and  
  to the approval of DEP." Br. at 35-36. They claim that the  
  district court correctly determined that it would be  
  unreasonable to find that the Agreement included an  
  implied reasonable time limitation, given the commercial  
  context of the sale and purchase.  
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 Appellees further assert that, in any event, even if we  
  agreed with appellants that the district court should have  
  implied a "reasonable time" limitation on Essex's  
  remediation obligations pursuant to Paragraph 16,  
  summary judgment was appropriate because there is no  
  evidence that Essex breached its contractual obligations in  
  that connection. They claim that the district court correctly  
  determined that appellants failed to meet their burden of  
  producing evidence demonstrating that as of the date that  
  appellants filed their complaint in the district court, Essex  
  had failed to remediate and detoxify the Property in  
  accordance with the Clean-Up Plan, and obtain DEP  
  approval of its efforts, within a reasonable time.  
    
 Appellees' protestations notwithstanding, we reject the  
  district court's conclusion that a reasonable time provision  
  was not implicit in Paragraph 16 of the Agreement. After  
  all, New Jersey courts uniformly have applied the principle  
  that "where no time is fixed for the performance of a  
  contract, by implication a reasonable time was intended."  
  See Becker, 543 A.2d at 983 (contract for sale of real  
  property); see also, e.g., River Dev. Corp. v. Liberty Corp.,  
  148 A.2d 721, 722 (N.J. 1959) (license to reclaim land must  
  be exercised within a reasonable time); Ridge Chevrolet-  
  Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Scarano, 569 A.2d 296, 300 (N.J. Super.  
  Ct. App. Div. 1990) (performance under real estate  
  contract); Mazzeo v. Kartman, 560 A.2d 733, 737 (N.J.  
  Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) ("If the trial judge cannot  
  determine the parties' actual intent [concerning the  
  temporal limits of a right of first refusal], he should  
  determine a `reasonable time' for the expiration of the  
  right."); Ocean Cape Hotel Corp. v. Masefield Corp., 164  
  A.2d 607, 614 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960) (where  
  plaintiff claimed that defendant was obligated to make  
  certain repairs to property, if plaintiff 's claim had been  
  based on breach of contract, the court would have implied  
  a term that required completion of performance within a  
  reasonable time and would not have permitted parol  
  evidence that defendant promised repairs as of a certain  
  fixed date); McGraw v. Johnson, 126 A.2d 203, 206 (N.J.  
  Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) (noting that performance under  
  contract must be completed within reasonable time where  
  claim was based on contractor's alleged failure to complete  
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 building of home within a reasonable time); Curtis Elevator  
  Co. v. Hampshire House, Inc., 362 A.2d 73, 76 (N.J. Super.  
  Ct. Law Div. 1976) (performance under contract to install  
  elevators; where no specific date for completion was  
  provided in contract, court implied term requiring  
  completion within a reasonable time).  
    
 The district court predicated its analysis on statements in  
  New Jersey cases to the effect that terms are implied to  
  "give business efficacy to the contract as written." See app.  
  at 8a (citing McGarry v. Saint Anthony of Padua Roman  
  Catholic Church, 704 A.2d 1353, 1357 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.  
  Div. 1998)). But appellants argue persuasively that it would  
  be commercially unreasonable to construe the terms of  
  Paragraph 16 so as to permit Essex to begin its cleanup at  
  its leisure, and to continue its efforts in perpetuity without  
  the threat or even the slightest possibility of adverse legal  
  consequences flowing from inordinate delay. We also doubt  
  that the parties could have intended such a bizarre result.  
  See Onderdonk v. The Presbyterian Homes of N.J., 425 A.2d  
  1057, 1063 (N.J. 1981) ("Central to this inquiry of  
  ascertaining what, if any, terms are implied is the intent of  
  the parties. Intent may be determined by examination of  
  the contract and in particular the setting in which it was  
  executed.").  
    
 Nevertheless, notwithstanding our holding that a  
  "reasonable time" term is implicit is Paragraph 16 of the  
  Agreement, we agree with the district court's alternative  
  basis for dismissing appellants' breach of contract claim,  
  i.e., that a reasonable time period has not expired.8 We are  
  mindful that "[w]hat constitutes a reasonable time under  
  New Jersey law `is usually an implication of fact, and not of  
  law, derivable from the language used by the parties  
  considered in the context of the subject matter and the  
  _________________________________________________________________  
    
 8. In view of our result appellees should understand that they do not  
  have forever to complete the remediation and detoxification. To the  
  contrary, they must diligently pursue their efforts to obtain the DEP  
  approval within a reasonable time. Of course, it is not our intention by  
  making this point to invite further litigation. We believe that if  
  appellees  
  are diligent in these efforts and keep appellants advised of the steps  
  they  
  are taking that the parties should be able to avoid additional judicial  
  proceedings.  
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 attendant circumstances, in aid of the apparent intention.' "  
  Mazzeo, 560 A.2d at 737 (quoting Borough of West Caldwell  
  v. Borough of Caldwell, 138 A.2d 402, 412 (N.J. 1958)).  
  Nevertheless, appellants would bear the burden of proof on  
  this issue at trial, to show that a reasonable time has  
  expired, and to survive summary judgment, they must  
  adduce evidence from which a reasonable jury could  
  conclude that Essex breached its contractual obligation to  
  complete its remediation and detoxification efforts within a  
  reasonable time. Here, even viewing the facts in the light  
  most favorable to appellants, we agree with the district  
  court's assessment of the weakness of appellants' evidence  
  as well as the court's conclusion that appellants failed to  
  demonstrate that there was a genuine issue of material fact  
  on the issue of whether Essex had breached its obligation  
  to remediate the Property and obtain DEP approval within  
  a reasonable time. Simply put, the record does not support  
  the conclusion that appellants posit, i.e., that Essex  
  breached its contractual duties to complete the remediation  
  and detoxification efforts within a reasonable time.  
    
 For example, appellants first point to an Essex"Expense  
  Appropriation Request" which indicated that the  
  "completion date" of the entire project would be "1987."9  
  App. at 777a. But we do not share appellants' view that  
  this evidence can support a conclusion that Essex breached  
  Paragraph 16 of the Agreement. Obviously, the fact that  
  Essex estimated its completion date incorrectly does not  
  support the conclusion that it has failed to cleanup the  
  Property within a reasonable time. While a party's advance  
  estimate of the time to complete a project might be  
  persuasive evidence of the reasonable time for that  
  undertaking, it is not in the circumstances here in which  
  the scope of the project was so uncertain.  
  _________________________________________________________________  
    
 9. According to the deposition testimony of Irwin Zonis, Essex's Chief  
  Environmental Officer who was involved in the remediation and  
  detoxification of the Property, the purpose of the Expense Appropriation  
  Request was to notify Essex's financial department of the amount of  
  funds deemed necessary for the completion of the project. He further  
  explained that the document "told the financial department that the  
  $320,000 would be expended by the end of 1987." App. at 189a.  
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 Appellants also rely on the fact that in March 1986,  
  shortly after the DEP approved Essex's Clean-Up Plan, Dr.  
  Calvin J. Benning ("Benning"), Director of Environmental  
  Affairs for Essex, wrote to the DEP questioning whether  
  certain of the standards set forth in the Clean-Up Plan with  
  respect to the contemplated soil remediation and whether  
  the Clean-Up Plan's requirements were reasonable in the  
  circumstances. App. at 225a-26a. For convenience, we will  
  refer to this correspondence as Essex's "March 1986 letter."  
  Appellants claim that the March 1986 letter was Essex's  
  "attempt[ ] to circumvent the parameters and conditions" of  
  its Clean-Up Plan, and that it demonstrates that Essex  
  failed to proceed "reasonably and diligently" with the  
  Property's detoxification. Br. at 46.  
    
 We cannot agree. The March 1986 letter questions the  
  cleanup levels relating to the soil remediation which Essex  
  completed within two years of the sale of the Property. See  
  generally app. at 235a; appellees' br. at 17. Certainly if  
  Essex also had completed the groundwater remediation  
  within that period appellants would not have instituted  
  litigation alleging a breach of Paragraph 16. Thus,  
  inasmuch as appellants' breach of contract claim  
  essentially is predicated on Essex's failure to complete  
  groundwater remediation, we fail to see how this letter  
  supports appellants' argument.  
    
 Similarly, appellants cite the fact that Essex did not  
  begin groundwater remediation efforts until 1988 or  
  remediation of the CVOCs until 1997. See br. at 47-48.  
  However, appellants do not present evidence indicating that  
  the delays were avoidable, and in any event, were  
  unreasonable. Also they rely on the circumstance that  
  groundwater pumping "was frequently interrupted  
  throughout the years," br. at 47, and that the DEP gave  
  Essex a rating of "unacceptable due to `failure to operate the  
  groundwater remediation system in the capacity it was  
  designed.' " App. at 298a (emphasis added). But a review of  
  the evidence in the record confirms that the interruptions  
  Essex experienced are not a basis for holding that it  
  unreasonably delayed its performance under Paragraph 16.  
  To the contrary, intermittent delays are to be expected on  
  a remediation project which cannot be compared to an  
    
                                 18  
    
     
    
 ordinary construction project built in accordance with fixed  
  plans which is thus far less likely to encounter problems  
  than a remediation undertaking. Moreover, as appellees  
  correctly point out, the DEP's "unacceptable" rating did not  
  relate to the length of time that Essex had expended on the  
  remediation and detoxification of the Property. Rather, the  
  DEP comments related to the need for Essex to implement  
  a sufficient maintenance program so that it could manage  
  the problems it had been experiencing with the wells more  
  efficiently in the future. See app. at 298a. Thus, we cannot  
  view the DEP's comments as tantamount to a statement  
  that Essex was taking too long to finish the Property  
  cleanup.  
    
 As the district court correctly observed, app. at 11a-12a,  
  appellants' strongest evidence on this score is a statement  
  by their environmental consultant, Irving Cohen of ESI.  
  Cohen issued a report in which he opined that "the  
  environmental program undertaken on this site has been  
  slow and ineffective in treating the contaminants that were  
  released by Essex Chemical." App. at 418a. In our view,  
  however, this statement does not create a factual issue for  
  the jury on the issue of unreasonable delay. Importantly,  
  Cohen stops short of stating definitively that, given the  
  circumstances, Essex had taken too long to complete its  
  remediation and detoxification efforts. Moreover, even if he  
  had stated such a conclusion it would not have an  
  adequate foundation as he does not analyze specifically the  
  types of contaminants involved in this project and the  
  circumstances surrounding the remediation of this site. Nor  
  does he compare Essex's efforts to other sites plagued with  
  similar environmental contaminants. Given the vague  
  nature of Cohen's conclusion, we agree with the district  
  court's observation that "evidence of a slow and ineffective  
  cleanup process, without more, cannot reasonably support  
  an inference that fourteen years is unreasonable." App. at  
  12a.  
    
 When boiled down to its essence, appellants' argument is  
  that because the cleanup of the Property has taken longer  
  to finish than the parties originally anticipated, Essex has  
  breached Paragraph 16 of the Agreement as it has not  
  completed the cleanup within a "reasonable time." While it  
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 may be unfortunate that it has taken Essex an extended  
  period of time to complete the cleanup of this Property, the  
  delay does not support a conclusion that the amount of  
  time it already has spent is unreasonable given the nature  
  of Essex's contractual obligation. By appellants' own  
  admission, the remediation and detoxification of the  
  Property is a large effort which, by its very nature, is a  
  lengthy and time-consuming process. Given the realities of  
  the situation, appellants simply have failed to point to any  
  evidence in this record demonstrating that the length of  
  time that Essex has taken to detoxify the Property and  
  obtain DEP approval is unreasonable in the circumstances.  
  Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's dismissal the  
  breach of contract claim.  
    
 2. Breach of the Implied Duty of Good Faith  
         and Fair Dealing (Count II)  
    
 The district court also dismissed appellants' claim based  
  on Essex's alleged breach of the implied duty of good faith  
  and fair dealing, reasoning:  
    
        In this case, plaintiffs allege only that Essex has failed  
         to complete the clean-up process and obtain final DEP  
         approval within a reasonable time. They point to no  
         acts or omissions done in bad faith. There is no  
         allegation, and certainly no evidence, that Essex has  
         committed any misconduct. Summary judgment is  
         therefore appropriate.  
    
 App. at 13a. Appellants claim that the district court erred  
  in granting summary judgment on this claim because it  
  ignored evidence from which a reasonable jury could  
  conclude that Essex breached the implied duty of good faith  
  and fair dealing during the course of its cleanup of the  
  Property. Appellants point to the following evidence in  
  support of their claim: (1) documents confirming that  
  appellees "attempted to renege upon the standards set forth  
  in the Clean-Up Plan"; (2) evidence showing that appellees  
  "inexplicably failed to even begin remediation for many  
  years after delineating contamination on the Property"; and  
  (3) DEP documents reprimanding Essex for " `violations' and  
  `unacceptable' progress." Br. at 49.  
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 To be sure, "every contract in New Jersey contains an  
  implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Sons of  
  Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575, 587 (N.J.  
  1997); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 205  
  (1981) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of  
  good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its  
  enforcement."). "The implied covenant is an independent  
  duty and may be breached even where there is no breach  
  of the contract's express terms." Emerson Radio Corp. v.  
  Orion Sales, Inc., 80 F. Supp.2d 307, 311 (D.N.J. 2000)  
  (citing, inter alia, Sons of Thunder, Inc., 690 A.2d at 575);  
  see also Bak-a-Lum Corp. v. Alcoa Bldg. Prods., Inc. , 351  
  A.2d 349, 352 (N.J. 1976).  
    
 The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing  
  requires that "neither party shall do anything which will  
  have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the  
  other party to receive the fruits of the contract." Sons of  
  Thunder, Inc., 690 A.2d at 587 (internal quotation marks  
  omitted); Palisades Properties, Inc. v. Brunetti , 207 A.2d  
  522, 531 (N.J. 1965). A party to a contract breaches the  
  covenant if it acts in bad faith or engages in some other  
  form of inequitable conduct in the performance of a  
  contractual obligation. See, e.g., Sons of Thunder, Inc., 690  
  A.2d at 589 (distinguishing prior decision in Karl's Sales &  
  Service, Inc. v Gimbel Bros. Inc., 592 A.2d 647 (N.J. Super.  
  Ct. App. Div. 1991), in which "there were no allegations of  
  bad faith or dishonesty on the part of the terminating  
  party" to the contract); Association Group Life, Inc. v.  
  Catholic War Veterans, 293 A.2d 382, 384 (N.J. 1972)  
  (stating that a contracting party breaches duty of good faith  
  and fair dealing by engaging in behavior that was"not  
  contemplated by the spirit of the contract and fell short of  
  fair dealing"); Emerson Radio Corp., 80 F. Supp.2d at 311  
  ("The Restatement and the [New Jersey] cases note a state  
  of mind or malice-like element to breach of good faith and  
  fair dealing, holding that the duty excludes activity that is  
  unfair, not decent or reasonable, nor dishonest."); Kapossy  
  v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 234, 248 (D.N.J. 1996)  
  (noting that courts "imply a covenant of good faith and fair  
  dealing in order to protect one party to a contract from the  
  other party's bad faith misconduct or collusion with third  
  parties where there is no breach of the express terms of the  
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 contract"); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 205  
  cmt. a (noting that "[t]he phrase `good faith' is used in a  
  variety of contexts, and its meaning varies somewhat with  
  the context" and explaining that "[g]ood faith performance  
  or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an  
  agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified  
  expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of  
  types of conduct characterized as involving `bad faith'  
  because they violate community standards of decency,  
  fairness or reasonableness.").10  
    
 Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts  
  provides examples of the types of behavior that can give  
  rise to a claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith  
  and fair dealing in the context of one's performance under  
  a contract:  
    
        Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good  
         faith in performance even though the actor believes his  
         conduct to be justified. But the obligation goes further:  
         bad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and  
         fair dealing may require more than honesty. A complete  
         catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, but the  
         following types are among those which have been  
         recognized in judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit of  
         the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off , willful  
         rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of power to  
         specify terms, and interference with or failure to  
         cooperate in the other party's performance.  
    
 Id. S 205 cmt. d (emphasis added).  
    
 Appellants' basic contention is that the circumstances of  
  this case demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of  
  material fact concerning Essex's lack of good faith in its  
  _________________________________________________________________  
    
 10. Quite coincidentally this very panel on the same day that it heard  
  argument in this case also heard argument in a case under Pennsylvania  
  law involving the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. See  
  Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., No. 99-3873, 2000 WL  
  1273953, ___ F.3d. ___ (3d Cir. Sept. 8, 2000). Plainly, New Jersey law  
  imposes a broader obligation on a party to a contract than Pennsylvania  
  law to act in good faith in its performance. The parties, however, do 
not  
  dispute that New Jersey law applies in this case, and we will decide the  
  case on that basis.  
    
                                 22  
    
     
    
 performance of its obligation to remediate the Property and  
  obtain DEP in accordance with Paragraph 16 of the  
  Agreement. They claim that since the DEP approved the  
  Clean-Up Plan in 1985, Essex has not performed its  
  cleanup in a diligent manner, and in fact, has engaged in  
  bad faith conduct purposely to protract the process.  
  According to appellants, Essex's conduct has precluded  
  them from obtaining the fruits of their contract, i.e., a  
  property that is not environmentally distressed.  
    
 We cannot agree that the evidence in this case supports  
  the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on the  
  issue of Essex's good faith in its performance of its  
  obligation to remediate and detoxify the Property. In reality,  
  appellants' argument rests exclusively on their subjective  
  interpretation of the March 1986 letter in which Benning  
  set forth the following reservations as to whether certain  
  aspects of the Clean-Up Plan were reasonable in the  
  circumstances:  
    
        The clean-up plan calls for the excavation and disposal  
         of the contaminated soil to a level of 1 ppm, . . . based  
         on the requirements of the case manager at BISE. I  
         believe these levels are extremely low and not  
         warranted. . . . We fully intend to remove the  
         contaminated dirt from the former tank farm area. . . .  
         However to satisfy BISE we are required to perform 15  
         separate sample analyses in the laboratory instead of  
         using a portable field analyzer to determine the extent  
         of pollution and excavation, and to excavate to 1 ppm  
         residual total VOC in the soil. I believe these  
         requirements are both unreasonable and unwarranted.  
         The clean up plan had to be approved by the end of  
         1985 and time was not available to question the  
         requirement or to rationally discuss these points.  
         However, the IAG discussion [which Benning attended  
         on March 18, 1986] indicate [sic] that the[DEP] has  
         also been rethinking some of their procedures and  
         actions. I believe hexane and heptane are classified as  
         hydrocarbon and I believe that a higher level than 1  
         ppm is perfectly justified.  
    
 App. at 225a-26a. Appellants claim that this letter exhibits  
  Essex's lack of good faith and confirms that Essex  
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 attempted to "renege upon the standards set forth in the  
  Cleanup Plan." Br. at 49; reply br. at 22-23.  
    
 While the letter questions whether the cleanup level of 1  
  ppm is warranted and whether lab analysis of soil samples  
  is necessary as opposed to Essex merely conductingfield  
  measurements of the soil, the letter does not demonstrate  
  a lack of good faith on Essex's part in performing its  
  obligations pursuant to Paragraph 16 of the Agreement.  
  First, as we previously mentioned, the letter discusses  
  Essex's obligations under the Clean-Up Plan relating to soil  
  remediation, but appellants do not dispute that Essex has  
  completed its soil remediation and detoxification efforts. In  
  fact, appellants confirmed that Essex began its cleanup of  
  the soil shortly after the sale, and that it completed soil  
  remediation sometime within two years. Thus, we fail to see  
  how this letter can demonstrate Essex's lack of diligence in  
  that regard, or how Essex's conduct in questioning certain  
  aspects of the Clean-Up Plan compromised appellants' right  
  "to receive the fruits of the contract." See Sons of Thunder,  
  Inc., 690 A.2d at 587 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
    
 Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, Benning wrote  
  the March 1986 letter after he met with DEP officials and  
  discussed the topic of appropriate cleanup levels in soil.  
  The letter specifically states that the "IAG discussion on  
  March 18 indicate [sic] that the department has also been  
  rethinking some of their procedures and actions." App. at  
  225a. Thus, while the letter questioned the reasonableness  
  of certain aspects of the Clean-Up Plan, Benning's  
  comments indicate that he did so because of his previous  
  discussions with DEP officials which apparently led him to  
  believe that the DEP might no longer view some of its  
  requirements as necessary or appropriate. Thus, when  
  viewed in context, the letter does not indicate that Essex  
  intended to renege on its obligation to cleanup the Property,  
  and it does not indicate that Essex performed its  
  contractual obligations with a lack of good faith.  
    
 In any event, Benning's concern over certain aspects of  
  the Clean-Up Plan is of no consequence when we consider  
  that less than two months later, he wrote a memorandum  
  to Essex officials in which he recognized and re-emphasized  
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 Essex's obligation to adhere to the requirements set forth in  
  Clean-Up Plan. The memorandum states:  
    
        Lately we have received letters from NJDEP and have  
         discussed our program and permit applications with  
         both state and local officials. These discussions have  
         led to some very specific program requirements and  
         items we must `keep in mind.'  
    
        For example:  
    
        1. The NJDEP's ECRA office and the department of  
         solid waste management have made it very clear  
         that we must adhere to the Clean Up Plan .  
    
 App. at 227a.  
    
 Simply put, the fact that Benning questioned certain  
  aspects of the Clean-Up Plan is not evidence that Essex  
  acted in bad faith, as the DEP obviously responded to  
  Benning's concerns by indicating that Essex was obligated  
  to remediate the Property in accordance with the Clean-Up  
  Plan, and Benning expressly reaffirmed Essex's intent to  
  comply with its contractual and statutory obligations in  
  that regard. Moreover, appellants do not demonstrate that  
  Essex ever failed to implement a substantive remediation  
  measure that the DEP required in connection with Essex's  
  cleanup of the Property, and do not dispute that Essex  
  completed soil remediation on the Property within two years  
  of the sale. In our view, Benning's May 1986 memorandum  
  reaffirming Essex's commitment to remediate the Property  
  in accordance with the Clean-Up Plan belies appellants'  
  assertion that the March 1986 letter evidences Essex's  
  intent from the outset to conduct its remediation and  
  detoxification efforts in "bad faith." Reply br. at 23. In the  
  circumstances, we will affirm the district court's dismissal  
  of appellants' claim that Essex breached the duty of good  
  faith and fair dealing.  
    
 3. Appellants' CERCLA Claim (Count III)  
         and Spill Act Claim (Count IV)  
    
 Count III of the amended complaint asserts a claim for  
  damages and injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to  
  CERCLA, and count IV seeks the same relief pursuant to  
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 the Spill Act. As previously mentioned, the district court  
  dismissed the CERCLA claim, reasoning that appellants  
  had not incurred any compensable "necessary costs of  
  response" pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA. See  
  42 U.S.C. S 9607(a)(4)(B). In particular, the court explained  
  that the only costs that appellants claimed to have incurred  
  were the fees they paid to their environmental consultant,  
  ESI. The district court found that those fees were not  
  recoverable under CERCLA "because they had nothing to  
  do with any effort by plaintiffs to detoxify the Property or to  
  prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances."  
  App. at 14a (emphasis added). The district court explained  
  that the fees were not recoverable because ESI merely  
  reviewed the quarterly reports that Essex submitted to  
  appellants and the DEP; ESI never visited the Property,  
  monitored the contamination or the cleanup of the  
  Property, or gathered data related to the investigation or  
  remediation of the Property. The district court stated that  
  "ESI's fees are those of an ordinary expert witness: the fees  
  represent litigation costs, not environmental monitoring  
  costs." App. at 15a. Similarly, the court dismissed  
  appellants' Spill Act claim seeking to recover ESI's fees  
  because the fees "are unrelated to any prevention,  
  mitigation, or remediation of contamination on the  
  Property." App. at 14a.  
    
 The district court also denied appellants' request for a  
  declaration that Essex is liable to appellants for any future  
  costs pursuant to CERCLA or the Spill Act. The court  
  stated that "[p]laintiffs have utterly failed to make any  
  showing that they are likely to incur any future costs that  
  will be recoverable under CERCLA or the Spill Act. Indeed,  
  it is undisputed that Essex is contractually obligated to  
  remediate the Property at its own expense." App. at 15a.  
  Inasmuch as there was "no evidence--or even an allegation  
  --that the plaintiffs intend to participate in future clean-up  
  activities or incur any costs that might be recoverable  
  under CERCLA," the court concluded that granting  
  declaratory relief would be inappropriate.  
    
 Finally, the court denied appellants' request for an  
  injunction compelling Essex to commence and complete the  
  cleanup on the basis that there was no present case or  
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 controversy. The court reasoned that "[t]here is no dispute  
  that Essex is under both a contractual and statutory duty  
  to detoxify the Property; nor is there any dispute that Essex  
  has worked continuously to remediate the Property." The  
  court further explained that "[i]n the absence of evidence  
  that Essex has breached the Agreement or violated CERCLA  
  or IRSA, there is no basis for the injunction that plaintiffs  
  seek." App. at 16a.  
    
 On appeal from the CERCLA and Spill Act dispositions,  
  appellants primarily claim that the district court erred in  
  dismissing their CERCLA claim for monetary relief. 11 While  
  _________________________________________________________________  
    
 11. We will address only briefly the several other issues appellants 
raise  
  in connection with their CERCLA and Spill Act claims pleaded in counts  
  III and IV of the amended complaint. Specifically, appellants maintain  
  that the district court erred in rejecting their request for injunctive  
  and  
  declaratory relief pursuant to CERCLA, and in dismissing count IV of the  
  amended complaint, their Spill Act claim. First, appellants contend that  
  they are entitled to declaratory relief under CERCLA even if they have  
  not incurred any compensable response costs as of yet, "[p]articularly  
  [because] in light of the inexplicable lack of progress by Defendants in  
  detoxifying the Property to date, Plaintiffs may well be forced to incur  
  future response costs to complete [the] detoxification. . . ." Br. at 52  
  (citing Bowen Eng'g v. Estate of Reeve, 799 F. Supp. 467, 476 (D.N.J.  
  1992), aff 'd, 19 F.3d 642 (3d Cir. 1994) (table)). They also state  
  generally that injunctive relief pursuant to CERCLA is appropriate in 
the  
  circumstances, but fail to explain the reason for their position on that  
  point. See id.  
    
 We reject appellants' arguments in their entirety. First, appellants have  
  not presented any evidence with respect to their request for a 
declaratory  
  judgment as to future response costs under CERCLA demonstrating that  
  such relief is appropriate. Given our discussion in the text that 
follows,  
  it is clear that appellants have not incurred any response costs to 
date,  
  and it is undisputed that Essex, rather than appellants, is bound  
  contractually to complete the cleanup of the Property and obtain final  
  DEP approval. Thus, there is nothing in the record suggesting that  
  appellants ever will incur response costs, and there is no potential for  
  injury that is "sufficiently immediate and real" so as to warrant  
  declaratory relief pursuant to section 113(g)(2) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.  
  S 9613(g)(2). See Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836,  
  845 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United  
  States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 819 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting statement  
  in Kelly, 17 F.3d at 844, that " `[i]n providing for the recovery of  
  response  
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 appellants have not set forth their CERCLA argument in  
  any detail, we understand they predicate it on a belief that  
  they are entitled to recover the amounts paid to appellants'  
  environmental consultant, ESI, as "necessary costs of  
  response" pursuant to section 107(a) of CERCLA, because  
  those "oversight costs" fall within the scope of either  
  _________________________________________________________________  
    
 costs, Congress included language [in section 113(g)(2)] to insure that a  
  responsible party's liability [for response costs], once established,  
  would  
  not have to be relitigated. . . .' ") (emphasis added)); The Southland  
  Corp.  
  v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 999 (D.N.J. 1988) ("To be 
granted  
  a declaratory judgment on the issue of liability, . . . plaintiff[ ] 
must  
  establish four factors to satisfy the requirements of section 107(a),"  
  including "that, as a result [of defendants' conduct], [plaintiff] has  
  incurred response costs."); compare Bowen Eng'g, 799 F. Supp. at 476  
  (stating that "[O]nce some expenditure [for response costs] has been  
  made, the controversy is sufficiently real to permit the court to issue 
a  
  declaratory judgment on defendant's liability.") (internal quotation 
marks  
  omitted). Second, appellants' vague assertion that injunctive relief is  
  appropriate in this case, without any further elaboration on that point,  
  is unconvincing.  
    
 Finally, we agree with the district court's disposition of the Spill Act  
  claim seeking both monetary and equitable relief. While we have  
  considered appellants' argument on this score, which essentially 
consists  
  only of a citation to T&E Industries, Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 
A.2d  
  1249 (N.J. 1991), we fail to see how the case is germane here because  
  it did not present claims under the Spill Act. In any event, after  
  reviewing the applicable statutory provisions and case law on point, we  
  are convinced that the district court did not err in dismissing count 
IV.  
  Accordingly, we will affirm the court's dismissal of the Spill Act claim  
  without further discussion. See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 58:10-23.11b.d.  
  (providing definition of "cleanup and removal costs" for purposes of 
Spill  
  Act); id. S 58:10-23.11g.c.(1) (stating that responsible persons are  
  "strictly liable, jointly and severally, without regard to fault, for 
all  
  cleanup and removal costs no matter by whom incurred") (emphasis  
  added); compare Analytical Measurements, Inc. v. The Keuffel & Esser  
  Co., 843 F. Supp. 920, 929-30 (D.N.J. 1993) (stating that costs of the  
  initial soil and groundwater investigation, analysis of problems and  
  alternatives, excavation of soil, removal of thefirst 600 tons of soil 
to  
  Ohio, and design of a groundwater investigation plan were "clearly  
  recoverable under the Spill Act since they are associated with the  
  cleanup and removal of discharged hazardous substances"; court also  
  noted that declaratory relief was appropriate because it would "resolve  
  any uncertainties over who is responsible for future cleanups").  
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 "removal" or "remedial" action as defined by section 101 of  
  CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. S 9601(23), (24). See generally br. at 53  
  (citing United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 401-02 (5th  
  Cir. 1997), which held, contrary to our decision in United  
  States v. Rohm and Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265 (3d Cir. 1993),  
  that EPA's costs incurred in oversight of the private party  
  cleanup of site were compensable "response costs"  
  pursuant to section 107(a) of CERCLA). Appellants state  
  that the court erred in finding that ESI's fees were those of  
  "an ordinary expert witness," inasmuch as"an `expert  
  witness' is clearly required only in the context of litigation  
  while, by contrast, Plaintiffs have been forced to retain and  
  utilize the expertise of ESI, an environmental consultant,  
  for the past fifteen years due to the lack of progress made  
  by Essex with respect to the Property's `detoxification.' " Br.  
  at 53.  
    
 Appellants' argument thus raises the issue of whether  
  ESI's fees are "necessary costs of response" for which  
  appellants, as private parties, may recover in a suit  
  pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B) against Essex, the party  
  indisputably responsible for the cleanup of the Property  
  pursuant to the Clean-Up Plan approved by the DEP. To  
  answer that question, we must ascertain the character of  
  the costs in question, and determine whether they fall  
  within the types of costs recoverable by an innocent party  
  pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA.  
    
 We begin with the relevant statutory language. Section  
  107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. S 9607(a)(4), provides that  
  certain enumerated parties "shall be liable for .. . all costs  
  of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States  
  Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent  
  with the national contingency plan; [and] . . . any other  
  necessary costs of response incurred by any other person  
  consistent with the national contingency plan. . . ." The  
  statute defines "response" as "remove, removal, remedy,  
  and remedial action," and states that these terms include  
  "enforcement activities related thereto." See CERCLA  
  section 101(25), 42 U.S.C. S 9601(25). It then defines  
  "remove or removal" and "remedy or remedial action" as  
  follows:  
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        (23) The terms `remove' or `removal' means[sic] the  
         cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances  
         from the environment, such actions as may be  
         necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of  
         hazardous substances into the environment, such  
         actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and  
         evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous  
         substances, the disposal of removed material, or the  
         taking of such other actions as may be necessary to  
         prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public  
         health or welfare or to the environment, which may  
         otherwise result from a release or threat of release. The  
         term includes, in addition, without being limited to,  
         security fencing or other measures to limit access,  
         provision of alternative water supplies, temporary  
         evacuation and housing of threatened individuals not  
         otherwise provided for, action taken under section  
         9604(b) of this title, and any emergency assistance  
         which may be provided under the Disaster Relief and  
         Emergency Assistance Act. . . .  
    
        (24) The terms `remedy' or `remedial action' means [sic]  
         those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken  
         instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event  
         of a release or threatened release of a hazardous  
         substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize  
         the release of hazardous substances so that they do  
         not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or  
         future public health or welfare or the environment. The  
         term includes, but is not limited to, such actions at the  
         location of the release as storage, confinement,  
         perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or ditches,  
         clay cover, neutralization, cleanup of released  
         hazardous substances and associated contaminated  
         materials, recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction,  
         segregation of reactive wastes, dredging or excavations,  
         repair or replacement of leaking containers, collection  
         of leachate and runoff, onsite treatment or  
         incineration, provision of alternative water supplies,  
         and any monitoring reasonably required to assure that  
         such actions protect the public health and welfare and  
         the environment. The term includes the costs of  
         permanent relocation of residents and businesses and  
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        community facilities where the President determines  
         that, alone or in combination with other measures,  
         such relocation is more cost-effective than and  
         environmentally preferable to the transportation,  
         storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition  
         offsite of hazardous substances, or may otherwise be  
         necessary to protect the public health or welfare; the  
         term includes offsite transport and offsite storage,  
         treatment, destruction, or secure disposition of  
         hazardous substances and associated contaminated  
         materials.  
    
 Section 101(23)(24), 42 U.S.C. S 9601(23), (24) (footnotes  
  omitted).  
    
 As we explained in United States v. Rohm and Haas Co.,  
  "[i]n general, removal actions are short term responses to a  
  release or threat of release while remedial actions involve  
  long term remedies." 2 F.3d at 1271. Here, while appellants  
  fail to recognize explicitly the distinction between"removal"  
  and "remedial" actions and do not attempt to place ESI's  
  consultant fees in either category, given the character of the  
  costs at issue we believe that if the activities involved here  
  are included within the definition of "response costs," it is  
  because they are "removal" rather than "remedial" actions.  
  Cf. id. (noting that the parties agreed that if the  
  government's oversight activities were deemed "necessary  
  costs of response," it would be because they were removal  
  actions rather than remedial actions).  
    
 Although the district court believed that ESI's consulting  
  fees are best characterized as those of an "ordinary expert  
  witness," appellants contest that statement by indicating  
  rather cryptically in their brief that ESI has been  
  appellants' environmental consultant for "fifteen years with  
  respect to the Property's `detoxification,' " and therefore  
  contend that we cannot consider ESI to be an "expert  
  witness" retained only for litigation purposes. While  
  appellants fail to cite an applicable portion of the record in  
  support of that statement, our review of the parties'  
  submissions confirms that Cohen testified at his deposition  
  that appellants had retained ESI as a consultant as early  
  as 1987 or 1988. See SA at 527.  
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 Nevertheless, based on our study of the record, exercising  
  plenary review we conclude that the district court did not  
  err in concluding that ESI's consulting fees for which  
  appellants seek reimbursement were litigation-related  
  expenses. Inasmuch as private parties may not recoup  
  litigation-related expenses in an action to recover response  
  costs pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA, see Key  
  Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819-20, 114  
  S.Ct. 1960, 1967 (1994); Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v.  
  Department of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 850 (3d Cir. 1995),  
  and appellants do not claim to have incurred any other  
  costs which fall within the definition of "necessary costs of  
  response," we agree with the district court's disposition of  
  the CERCLA claim.  
    
 In Redland Soccer Club, we determined that the Redland  
  plaintiffs' litigation costs, which included attorney's fees,  
  health risk assessments and expert witness fees, were not  
  "response costs" under any of the statutory definitions  
  found in section 9601 of CERCLA. 55 F.3d at 849-50 &  
  n.12 (citing, inter alia, Key Tronic Corp., 511 U.S. at 819,  
  114 S.Ct. at 1967, which held that litigation-related  
  attorney's fees were not recoverable in a private response  
  cost recovery action). In reaching our result, wefirst  
  observed that "under section [107], plaintiffs may only  
  recover response costs which are necessary and consistent  
  with the [National Contingency Plan]." Id. at 850. Second,  
  we found that "[t]he heart of these definitions of removal  
  and remedy are `directed at containing and cleaning up  
  hazardous releases.' . . . [T]herefore[,] . . . `necessary costs  
  of response' must be necessary to the containment and  
  cleanup of hazardous releases." Id. (quoting United States v.  
  Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1448 (10th Cir. 1992) (alteration  
  in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Given that  
  the costs incurred were all litigation-related expenses  
  unrelated to any remedial or response action at the  
  property itself, we stated that "we do not believe the district  
  court erred in determining that plaintiffs' costs are not  
  response costs because they are not `monies . . . expended  
  to clean up sites or to prevent further releases of hazardous  
  chemicals.' " Id. (quoting Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v.  
  Department of Army, 801 F. Supp. 1432, 1435 (M.D. Pa.  
  1992), aff 'd in relevant part, 55 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 1995)).  
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 Here, as in Redland, the record required the district court  
  to reach its conclusion that the costs for which the parties  
  involved were seeking reimbursement were litigation-related  
  expenses, and thus do not fall within the definition of  
  "necessary costs of response." We first point out that,  
  notwithstanding appellants' use of ESI's services prior to  
  the commencement of this litigation, the billing statements  
  that appellants submitted as proof of the amounts  
  expended for ESI's service were for "consulting fees."  
  Importantly, the billing statements cover services that ESI  
  rendered in connection with the Property intermittently  
  from November 1996 to May 1998. See SA at 1-17.  
  Obviously, inasmuch as appellants filed their complaint in  
  the district court in March 1997, appellants are seeking  
  reimbursement for consulting services rendered just prior  
  to the time that they commenced this litigation, as well as  
  reimbursement for services during the duration of the  
  proceedings in the district court. The timing of the  
  transactions demonstrates that the district court correctly  
  concluded that ESI performed consulting services in  
  anticipation of appellants instituting this litigation, and also  
  performed consulting work during the pendency of this  
  litigation.  
    
 In this connection, we find it significant that Cohen  
  prepared an expert report for purposes of this litigation on  
  behalf of ESI for appellants dated April 28, 1998, see app.  
  at 412a, and that ESI correspondingly recorded a  
  significant charge on its billing statement to USLR for that  
  billing period. See SA at 13. The only reasonable inference  
  we can draw from these circumstances is that the  
  "consulting fee" that appellants paid to ESI for that time  
  period represented, at least in significant part, ESI's  
  payment for its preparation of the expert report.  
    
 Second, we note that the record reflects, and it is not  
  disputed, that as appellants' environmental consultant,  
  ESI's responsibilities were limited to reviewing Essex's  
  quarterly reports it submitted to the DEP, and to providing  
  appellants with a summary or analysis of Essex's  progress  
  in completing its remediation and detoxification efforts in  
  accordance with the approved Clean-Up Plan. See  app. at  
  466a; see also SA at 527. Indeed, ESI was not involved in  
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 Essex's cleanup effort; it neither performed an investigation  
  of the Property nor gathered data for that purpose. In our  
  view, the nature of Essex's responsibilities toward its  
  clients as described in the record thus confirms that it was  
  retained to assess, for litigation purposes, whether Essex  
  was complying with its contractual responsibility to cleanup  
  the Property pursuant to the requirements set out in the  
  Clean-Up Plan.  
    
 Moreover, it is relevant to our analysis that Berger's  
  deposition testimony, as appellants' designated Rule  
  30(b)(6) witness, is far from illuminating on the necessary  
  costs of response issue. Contrary to the spirit of Rule  
  30(b)(6), Berger's evasive answers provide us with little  
  assistance in determining the exact purpose for which  
  appellants retained ESI, the nature of ESI's services that  
  are referenced cryptically in the billing invoices in the  
  record, and whether the costs incurred in relation thereto  
  were the result of litigation-related consultation or were  
  incurred in connection with work performed for some other  
  purpose. Berger's responses clearly do not suggest that  
  ESI's consulting fees were anything other than expenses  
  incurred in connection with the lawsuit that appellants  
  eventually might file if they were not satisfied with Essex's  
  progress (and ultimately did file) against appellees. We only  
  need cite the following colloquy between Essex's counsel  
  and Berger, which occurred at his deposition, to illustrate  
  our point:  
    
        Q: [Referring to the invoices for ESI] Mr. Berger, have  
         you ever seen those bills before?  
    
        A. I have no idea.  
    
        Q. Well, then look through them.  
    
        A. I could look through them for the next five hours  
         and I would have no idea. We've 90 properties. I get  
         bills from people. There are bills going into 1997 and  
         before. I have no idea whether I have ever seen these  
         bills or any other bills you might put in front of me  
         today.  
    
        Q. Mr. Berger, other than the charges represented in  
         those bills, are there any other costs that have been  
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        expended by any plaintiff for any environmental  
         consulting or removal or remediation with respect to  
         the Black Horse Lane property?  
    
        A. I have no idea.  
    
        Q. Do you know a man named Mr. Irving Cohen?  
    
        A. Yes.  
    
        Q. How long have you known him?  
    
        A. I would say about ten years.  
    
        Q. And in what capacity do you know him?  
    
        A. Mr. Cohen was the president of Enviro-Sciences. It's  
         an environmental consulting firm.  
    
        Q. Has that firm ever been used by [appellant] Black  
         Horse Lane Associates?  
    
        A. I have no idea.  
    
        Q. Looking through the exhibits, if you could, could  
         you tell me whether those bills appear to indicate that  
         such was the case?  
    
        A. These bills are--at least the ones that I can see here  
         --are from Enviro-Sciences, Inc. They reference Essex  
         Chem, and I will tell you that every one references  
         Essex Chem, except for those that reference Black  
         Horse Lane, which is the subject property of this  
         lawsuit. Other than that, I can't tell you anything  
         about these bills. All I'm doing is reading from the bills  
         for you.  
    
        Q. Turn to the bills that talk about Black Horse Lane,  
         Phase One, I believe.  
    
        A. There's a bill dated 10-16-97 that says `Phase One,  
         Black Horse Lane.'  
    
        Q. All right. To what does that bill refer?  
    
        A. I don't understand the question.  
    
        Q. What does Phase One, Black Horse Lane refer to?  
    
        A. I have no idea.  
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        Q. Did you ever order a Phase One on Black Horse  
         Lane?  
    
        A. I have no idea.  
    
        Q. Do you have an understanding what the phrase  
         `Phase One' means?  
    
        A. Yes, I do.  
    
        Q. What is that?  
    
        A. It's a preliminary environmental report which  
         basically points out areas of potential environmental  
         concern.  
    
        Q. Does it include any invasive testing, as far as you  
         know?  
    
        A. Typically, no.  
    
        Q. Do you have any idea why Black Horse Lane would  
         have ordered a Phase One at or about the time period  
         for which the bill is indicated?  
    
        A. Sitting here today, I have no idea why we did or  
         didn't. I suspect if we did, in fact, order one a year ago,  
         at that point I had a reason for it, but I don't know  
         what that reason would be sitting here today. If, in  
         fact, we did order a Phase One. I don't recall that  
         either.  
    
 App. at 544a. Our review of the remainder of Berger's  
  deposition testimony regarding the nature of ESI's  
  consulting work for appellants confirms that he failed to  
  offer any useful information concerning the factual basis for  
  appellants' CERCLA response cost claim relating to the fees  
  paid for ESI's services. See generally app. at 544a-49a.  
    
 Given the totality of the information in the record, we  
  agree with the district court's assessment of the nature of  
  ESI's consulting responsibilities to its client during the time  
  period for which appellants seek reimbursement. We believe  
  that the record requires the conclusion that ESI's work was  
  designed to assess, for potential or actual litigation  
  purposes, the extent of Essex's remediation efforts and its  
  progress in that regard. Accordingly, ESI's consulting fees  
  charged in connection with its services are not"response  
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 costs" that are recoverable in a private cost recovery suit  
  pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA.12  
    
 In any event, assuming arguendo that we were to accept  
  appellants' position that ESI's consulting fees were not for  
  strictly "litigation costs" in the sense that appellants  
  retained ESI's services during the relevant time period  
  solely to assist them in preparing to litigate this matter, we  
  nevertheless would reach the result we do, primarily for two  
  reasons. First, appellants cannot reasonably deny that the  
  record demonstrates that ESI's role was limited to  
  evaluating Essex's progress on the cleanup effort and to  
  reporting its progress (or lack thereof) to appellants. Indeed,  
  it is significant that neither appellants nor ESI have played  
  any role in the containment and cleanup of the Property. At  
  best, it appears that ESI served as appellants'  
  environmental advisor in relation to the Property, and that  
  appellants simply monitored, for their own benefit, Essex's  
  progress in its cleanup efforts. Given that neither ESI nor  
  appellants were involved in any capacity in the actual  
  environmental cleanup of the Property, it is clear that the  
  fees appellants paid in connection with ESI's consulting  
  work did not relate to any remedial or response action at  
  the Property. As in Redland, the funds for which appellants  
  seek reimbursement were not "necessary to the  
  containment and clean up of hazardous releases," see  
  Redland, 55 F.3d at 850 (emphasis added), inasmuch as  
  appellants simply had no involvement in any remedial or  
  removal actions on the Property. Cf. Key Tronic Corp., 511  
  U.S. at 820, 114 S.Ct. at 1967 (stating that "some lawyers'  
  _________________________________________________________________  
    
 12. Again, we have not overlooked the circumstance that there are  
  references in the record to the fact that Cohen performed some  
  undefined environmental work for appellants prior to the dates found on  
  the billing invoices in the record. See, e.g. , app. at 546a (Berger  
  testifying  
  that he had a "general recollection" that Cohen of ESI performed  
  "environmental work" for Black Horse Lane Associates prior to February  
  14, 1997). Nevertheless, as we previously stated, the invoices submitted  
  indicate that the environmental consulting for which appellants seek  
  reimbursement in this cost recovery claim began in November 1996 and  
  continued intermittently through May 1998. Thus, while it appears that  
  ESI performed work for appellants prior to its work for which they seek  
  reimbursement, that fact is irrelevant inasmuch as appellants only seek  
  reimbursement for those amounts listed on the billing invoices.  
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 work that is closely tied to the actual cleanup  may  
  constitute a necessary cost of response in and of itself  
  under the terms of S 104(a)(4)(B)," andfinding that the  
  component of claim that covers attorneys' work in  
  identifying other potentially responsible parties fell within  
  that category).  
    
 Second, inasmuch as ESI's role was limited to reviewing  
  the manner in which Essex was performing its legal  
  obligation to remediate the Property and reporting Essex's  
  progress to appellants, we think it fair to characterize ESI  
  as an "overseer" of Essex's progress on behalf of appellants.  
  But our decision in Rohm & Haas precludes appellants  
  from recovering such "oversight" costs as"response costs"  
  pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA. In Rohm &  
  Haas, we held that the EPA could not recover from the  
  statutory responsible party the cost of its "oversight" of the  
  remedial actions performed and paid for by the private  
  party. See 2 F.3d at 1278. The oversight costs the EPA  
  incurred there included "direct costs (i.e. , hiring contractors  
  to provide sampling support and field investigation) and  
  indirect costs (i.e., travel costs, payroll, hiring contractors to  
  review [defendants'] work"). Id.  at 1269 n.4 (emphasis  
  added). We stated that the "key issue" was whether  
  CERCLA's definition of "removal" should be read "to  
  encompass the government's activity in overseeing a  
  removal or remedial action paid for and conducted by  
  private parties." Id. at 1275.  
    
 In reaching our conclusion, we looked to the definition of  
  "removal" found in section 101(23) of CERCLA, and noted  
  that "[n]owhere in the definition of removal is there an  
  explicit reference to oversight of activities conducted and  
  paid for by a private party." Id. at 1275. Moreover, we  
  reviewed the five categories in the definition of removal,  
  with particular focus on the third of the five, i.e., "such  
  actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and  
  evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous  
  substances," as the EPA argued that it was that aspect of  
  the definition that applied to permit recovery of the  
  oversight costs it sought. In analyzing this language, we  
  rejected the EPA's argument that it supported the relief  
  requested, explaining our holding as follows:  
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         Examined in a vacuum, this language could be  
         understood to encompass at least some oversight of the  
         activities of a private party, particularly private  
         activities focusing on assessment of the risk. On the  
         other hand, it is at least as plausible to read this  
         language as referring only to actual monitoring of a  
         release or threat of release rather than oversight of the  
         monitoring and assessment activities of others. This  
         latter reading would be consistent with an  
         understanding of the definition that distinguishes at all  
         stages--assessment, response formulation, and  
         execution--between actions taken to define the scope  
         of the risk created by a release or threatened release  
         and actions taken to evaluate the performance of  
         others to determine whether they are meeting their  
         legal obligations. We believe a reading of the statutory  
         definition that embraces this distinction is  
         linguistically the more plausible one.  
    
 Id. at 1275-76. We further concluded that"[a]ll things  
  considered, we cannot say that clause [3] of the removal  
  definition is sufficient to constitute the clear statement of  
  intent required by [National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v.  
  United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342, 94 S.Ct. 1146, 1149-50  
  (1974) ("NCTA")]."13  Id. at 1276.  
  _________________________________________________________________  
    
 13. Obviously, we premised our result in Rohm & Haas on our  
  application of the NCTA doctrine, which we believed required the EPA to  
  demonstrate "a clear statement of congressional intent" for it to 
recover  
  the oversight costs as response costs. See 2 F.3d at 1273, 1276. But our  
  application of the NCTA doctrine does not undermine our reliance on our  
  statutory interpretation analysis in Rohm & Haas  as germane here.  
  Plainly put, we reach our result because the language of the relevant  
  statutory provisions requires that we do so. Indeed, the only plausible  
  basis for finding that appellants' oversight actions through ESI are  
  "removal" activities is if they fall within the third category of 
"removal"  
  actions, i.e., actions "necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the  
  release or threat of release of hazardous substances." But as we  
  explained in Rohm & Haas, this language plainly refers to actual  
  monitoring, assessment or evaluation "of a release or a threat of 
release."  
  Id. at 1275 (emphasis added). Here, ESI's oversight activities, to the  
  extent that we are willing for the sake of argument to deem them  
  monitoring, assessment or evaluation activities, were not related to the  
  release or threat of release of hazardous substances. Rather, the object  
  of ESI's reports, insofar as we can tell from the record, was to analyze  
  Essex's removal activities, including its cleanup, disposal, monitoring  
  and assessment actions, as described in its quarterly reports to the 
DEP.  
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 Our interpretation of the removal definition as excluding  
  the sort of "oversight" costs that the EPA sought in Rohm &  
  Haas compels the conclusion that appellants cannot  
  recover the funds paid to ESI for its consultant work, even  
  though appellants are private entities rather than a  
  governmental agency. As in Rohm & Haas, appellants seek  
  reimbursement from Essex, the responsible party, for costs  
  appellants incurred in monitoring the responsible party's  
  compliance with its legal obligations. See Rohm & Haas, 2  
  F.3d at 1279 n.23 ("The oversight costs here held to be  
  non-recoverable are incurred at a different level of  
  supervision. They are the costs of overseeing the  
  performance of the entity that has assumed responsibility  
  for the cleanup."). Indeed, there is no dispute in this case  
  that Essex is bound contractually to complete remediation  
  and detoxification of the Property, and that appellants have  
  not assisted Essex in meeting its statutory and contractual  
  obligations. In this sense, then, the district court was  
  correct in its observation that the costs for which  
  appellants seek reimbursement were not incurred as a  
  result of appellants' actions in cleaning up the Property.  
    
 Obviously then, inasmuch as our holding in Rohm &  
  Haas precludes the EPA from seeking reimbursement for  
  "oversight" costs incurred in overseeing the performance of  
  a private entity where a private party has assumed  
  responsibility for the cleanup, an analysis of the scope of  
  the "removal" definition necessarily requires us to reach the  
  same result in a situation where a private party seeks  
  reimbursement for overseeing another private party's legal  
  obligation to cleanup a property. In short, we are satisfied  
  that Congress did not intend section 107(a)(4)(B) to provide  
  a private party with a cause of action against a responsible  
  party for reimbursement of the party's expenses in  
  retaining an environmental consultant for oversight  
  purposes without direct involvement in the responsible  
  party's remediation and detoxification efforts.  
    
 In sum, we are convinced that the district court correctly  
  determined that appellants could not recover, pursuant to  
  section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA, the monies they expended  
  in consulting fees in connection with ESI's services during  
  the relevant time period. We will affirm the district court's  
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 dismissal of appellants' private cost recovery action pleaded  
  in count III of the amended complaint.14  
    
 B. District Court's Final Order of  
  December 16, 1999  
    
 Appellants next contend that the district court erred in  
  affirming the magistrate judge's letter opinion and order  
  entered June 30, 1999, which granted appellees' motion for  
  discovery sanctions against appellants pursuant to Rule  
  37(b) and (d).15 As we previously mentioned, the magistrate  
  _________________________________________________________________  
    
 14. We also will dismiss appellants' Spill Act claim under Count IV. See  
  n.11, supra. Moreover, as we previously mentioned, count V of the  
  complaint pleaded a claim for "damages" stemming from appellees'  
  alleged "acts, omissions and breaches." App. at 66a. The district court  
  dismissed this count, stating that "[b]ecause plaintiffs have failed to  
  adduce sufficient evidence in support of their breach of contract 
claims,  
  they cannot recover the damages outlined in Count Five of the  
  Complaint." Id. at 16a. Inasmuch as we agree with the district court's  
  dismissal of counts I through IV of the complaint, we will affirm the  
  district court's dismissal of count V, as there is no independent  
  substantive basis for appellants' claim for relief.  
    
 15. Appellants also maintain that the district court erred in dismissing  
  appellees' counterclaim without prejudice. The counterclaim sought a  
  declaratory judgment that remediation of the Property under the  
  Agreement included use of "engineering and institutional controls," and  
  an order requiring appellants to consent to them. App. at 80a-81a.  
  Appellees explain that their counterclaim actually sought an order  
  compelling appellants to consent to their use of a Classification  
  Exception Area ("CEA"), which is "a remediation by passive rather than  
  active means." App. at 845a.  
    
 As we previously mentioned, appellants initially sought partial  
  summary judgment to dismiss the counterclaim with prejudice, but the  
  district court denied their motion in its order of August 10, 1999,  
  reasoning that appellants failed to demonstrate that they were entitled 
to  
  judgment as a matter of law. The court observed that appellants failed  
  to cite any authority in support of the motion, and"merely allege[d] 
that  
  `Plaintiffs do not and need not consent' to the engineering and  
  institutional controls." App. at 16. After the court dismissed the  
  amended complaint in its entirety, appellees moved for summary  
  judgment on the counterclaim. After oral argument on appellees' motion,  
  the court entered an order dismissing the counterclaim without  
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 judge agreed with appellees' argument that Berger's  
  conduct warranted a sanction in the form of precluding  
  appellants from asserting a position and introducing  
  evidence contrary to the position Berger asserted during his  
  deposition. In addition, the magistrate judge concluded that  
  Berger's lack of preparedness at his deposition justified the  
  imposition of monetary sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(d) in  
  the form of costs and attorney's fees associated with taking  
  the deposition and bringing the sanctions motion before the  
  court. App. at 22a. The magistrate judge clearly set forth  
  the factual and legal basis for his ruling, relying primarily  
  on the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's decision in  
  Resolution Trust Corp. v. Southern Union Co., 985 F.2d 196  
  (5th Cir. 1993) ("Southern Union"):  
    
        Here, Berger was not completely prepared on any  
         occasion for which he sat for a deposition. Further, his  
  _________________________________________________________________  
    
 prejudice, because, in its view, there was no current case or controversy  
  with respect to the subject matter of the counterclaim.  
    
 We have reviewed the entire record, and we agree with the district  
  court's disposition of the counterclaim. It appears that the appellees  
  instituted the counterclaim in response to certain statements by  
  appellants to the effect that they would not consent to the use of a CEA  
  to remediate the Property, and would oppose any application that Essex  
  made to the DEP for that purpose. Appellees' br. at 14. Nevertheless, 
the  
  court's dismissal of the counterclaim was appropriate because appellees  
  do not dispute that Essex has not applied for a CEA, and presently  
  cannot do so. Accordingly, appellants' threats to the effect that they  
  would not consent to the use of a CEA do not present a controversy ripe  
  for resolution, and the court did not err in dismissing the counterclaim  
  without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g.,  
  Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers v. Ridge, 150 F.3d 319, 323 (3d Cir.  
  1998) (discussing and applying ripeness doctrine in context of claims  
  seeking declaratory relief, and noting that "[t]he function of the  
  ripeness  
  doctrine is to prevent federal courts, `through avoidance of premature  
  adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.' ")  
  (quoting Abbot Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507  
  (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99,  
  105, 97 S.Ct. 980 (1977)); The Presbytery of N.J. v. Florio, 40 F.3d at  
  1462 (addressing ripeness issue in context of suit seeking declaratory  
  relief and stating that "[i]t is the plaintiff 's responsibility to 
allege  
  facts  
  that invoke the court's jurisdiction").  
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        lack of preparation cannot be a mere oversight but is,  
         instead, a clear demonstration of bad faith. This is  
         obvious from Berger's repeated denial of any knowledge  
         of his status as a 30(b)(6) witness despite being present  
         at the deposition and being asked each and every time  
         he appeared if he had knowledge of his status. Further,  
         Berger, as did the plaintiffs' witness in Resolution Trust  
         Corp., even denied knowledge of documents which he  
         himself had signed, claiming that he had no  
         recollection of such documents despite acknowledging  
         that he normally did not sign anything that he did not  
         read first. These infractions would not be so  
         detrimental if Berger were no so consistent with his  
         apparent incompetence and lack of cooperation. Had  
         he taken the time to prepare in the slightest as Rule  
         30(b)(6) requires, he might have been fully prepared for  
         at least one deposition. Additionally, Berger's actions  
         are magnified by his status as a member of the Bar.  
    
 App. at 21a.  
    
 In affirming the magistrate judge's order, the district  
  court provided its reasons on the record:  
    
        I read the record. It is appalling. It is appalling.  
    
         [Berger] did nothing except show his face only under  
         the threat of court orders. When he showed up, he  
         knew he was a 30(b)(6) witness and, notwithstanding  
         the fact that he knew he was a 30(b)(6) witness, he  
         refused to answer questions in an intelligent way. He  
         refused to prepare, as you are required to prepare  
         under 30(b)(6), to intelligently answer questions and  
         just literally thumbed his nose at the defendants and,  
         frankly, at the Court.  
    
        . . . .  
    
        I'm satisfied, based upon my review of the record--and  
         I defy anyone to look at the record here which was  
         created by Mr. Berger--that the actions taken by[the  
         magistrate judge] were well within his discretion and  
         do not constitute either an abuse of discretion or are  
         they contrary to law or shocking to the conscience of  
         the Court.  
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         One, in order to come to that conclusion, one must  
         live in the shoes of [the magistrate judge] in trying to  
         conduct orderly discovery in this matter.  
    
         One must review meticulously the record of  
         noncompliance by Mr. Berger in this matter.  
    
         [The magistrate judge] did not issue this opinion  
         lightly. [The magistrate judge] was fully cognizant of  
         the totality of the facts surrounding this matter, which  
         border upon almost conscious disregard of the Court  
         and the court rules. . . .  
    
        Affirmed.  
    
 App. at 836a, 843a-44a.  
    
 Appellants make two arguments in support of their  
  request to vacate the monetary sanctions order. 16 They first  
  claim that the district court abused its discretion in  
  affirming the magistrate judge's monetary sanctions  
  because the court misunderstood the requirements for  
 
  imposing sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(d). They assert  
  that Rule 37 required as a prerequisite to imposing a  
  monetary sanction that the court first issue an order  
  compelling appellants to supply the requested discovery  
  responses, and then find that they failed to do so. See  
  Reply Br. at 29. They further claim that pursuant to Rule  
  37(d), "a party making a motion based upon an alleged  
  violation of Rule 37(d) must certify that the movant has in  
  good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party  
  failing to answer or respond in an effort to obtain such  
  answer or response without court action," but that there  
  was no such "good faith" effort by appellees to resolve the  
  _________________________________________________________________  
    
 16. Appellants also claim that the court abused its discretion in 
granting  
  appellees' motion pursuant to Rule 37(b) to the extent that it precluded  
  appellants from asserting at trial a position which differs from 
Berger's  
  testimony. Given that we are affirming the summary judgment  
  dismissing the amended complaint in its entirety, we need not address  
  this argument. Also, appellants apparently contend that the court erred  
  in awarding a monetary sanction pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2). This  
  argument is without merit, as it is clear to us that the court awarded  
  attorney's fees and costs pursuant to subdivision (d) of Rule 37 rather  
  than subdivision (b). See App. at 22a (citing Rule 37(d)).  
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 dispute without court action. Reply Br. at 30 (internal  
  quotation marks omitted).  
    
 Finally, they rely on the fact that Rule 37(d) states that  
  sanctions may be imposed when a party, inter alia, "fails  
  . . . to appear before the officer who is to take the  
  deposition, after being served with a proper notice." Here,  
  they argue that we should apply the "fails to appear"  
  language literally, and that sanctions were inappropriate in  
  this case because Berger appeared for his deposition after  
  the magistrate judge's October 15, 1998 order and"testified  
  under oath for more than seventeen hours." Br. at 59-60. In  
  support of their literal reading of Rule 37(d), they rely  
  primarily on the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's  
  opinion in R.W. International Corp. v. Welsh Foods, Inc., 937  
  F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1991), which stated that "Rule 37(d)  
  sanctions apply only when a deponent `literally fails to  
  show up for a deposition session.' " Id.  at 15 n.2 (quoting  
  Salahuddin v. Harris, 782 F.2d 1127, 1131 (2d Cir. 1986)).  
    
 Their second argument is based on their interpretation of  
  Berger's behavior during his deposition. They claim that  
  even if we agree with the magistrate judge's finding that  
  Rule 37(d) could support the imposition of sanctions when  
  a Rule 30(b)(6) witness provides inadequate and evasive  
  answers, the record demonstrates that Berger's deposition  
  did not present a situation warranting sanctions. They  
  claim that "[a] fair examination of the transcript of Mr.  
  Berger's 570-page deposition confirms that Mr. Berger  
  testified fully and in good faith in response to Defendants'  
  questioning." In any event, they maintain that"any  
  `violation' of Rule 30(b)(6) which might be said to have  
  existed was minimal, and indeed, paled in comparison with  
  the extraordinarily broad discovery obtained by Defendants  
  in this matter." Br. at 63.  
    
 We are not persuaded by either contention. Beginning  
  with appellants' interpretation of the language of Rule 37(d),17  
  _________________________________________________________________  
    
 17. Rule 37(d) provides:  
    
        (d) Failure of Party to Attend at Own Deposition or Serve Answers  
  to  
         Interrogatories or Respond to Request for Inspection. If a party 
or  
  an  
         officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person  
  designated  
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 they simply are incorrect that the magistrate judge  
  committed an error of law in awarding a monetary sanction  
  to appellees. Initially, we point out that unlike subdivision  
  (b) of Rule 37, on its face subdivision (d) does not require  
  the court, prior to imposing sanctions, to have issued an  
  order compelling discovery. See Al Barnett & Son, Inc. v.  
  Outboard Marine Corp., 611 F.2d 32, 35 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[A]  
  direct order by the Court, as Rule 37(a) and (b) requires, is  
  not a necessary predicate to imposing penalties under Rule  
  37(d)."), repudiated on other grounds, Alexander v. Gino's  
  Inc., 621 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1980); compare  Fed. R. Civ. P.  
  37(b)(2) ("If a party . . . or a person designated under Rule  
  30(b)(6) . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit  
  discovery, including an order made under subdivision (a) of  
  this rule . . . .") with Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d) (stating that if the  
  party fails, inter alia, to appear for a deposition, "the court  
  . . . may make such orders in regard to the failure as are  
  just"). Moreover, while appellants claim that subdivision (d)  
  _________________________________________________________________  
    
        under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails 
(  
  1) to  
         appear before the officer who is to take the deposition, after  
  being  
         served with a proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or 
objections  
  to  
         interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of  
  the  
         interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a request  
  for  
         inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the  
         request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may  
         make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among  
         others it may take any action authorized under subparagraphs (A),  
         (B), and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. Any motion  
  specifying  
         a failure under clause (2) or (3) of this subdivision shall 
include  
  a  
         certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or  
         attempted to confer with the party failing to answer or respond 
in  
  an  
         effort to obtain such answer or response without court action. In  
         lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall require  
  the  
         party failing to act or the attorney advising that party or both 
to  
  pay  
         the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the  
         failure unless the court finds that the failure was substantially  
         justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses  
         unjust.  
    
         The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be  
         excused on the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable  
         unless the party failing to act has a pending motion for a  
  protective  
         order as provided by Rule 26(c).  
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 requires the party seeking sanctions to certify in their  
  motion papers that they conferred or attempted to confer in  
  good faith with the party failing to answer or respond in an  
  effort to avoid court intervention, subdivision (d) explicitly  
  only requires such a certification where the motion specifies  
  a failure "under clause (2) or (3) of this subdivision." Fed.  
  R. Civ. P. 37(d). Here, appellees made the motion for  
  sanctions based on clause (1) of subdivision (d), which  
  deals with a party's failure "(1) to appear before the officer  
  who is to take the deposition." Id.  
    
 In addition, while we recognize that the court's statement  
  in Welsh Foods supports appellants' interpretation of the  
  language of Rule 37(d)--namely that it requires an actual  
  "no show" to satisfy the "fails to appear" requirement in  
  subdivision (1)--they apparently have overlooked the  
  circumstance that the magistrate judge's decision relied on  
  Southern Union, 985 F.2d 196. Importantly, in Southern  
  Union the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected a  
  literal interpretation of Rule 37(d) in situations where  
  the uncooperative deponent is a party's Rule 30(b)(6)  
  designated witness.  
    
 In Southern Union the defendant Southern Union Co.  
  ("Southern Union") served notice on the RTC that it  
  intended to depose it pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), and set  
  forth with specificity ten discrete topics with which the  
  deponent was to be familiar. After the RTC designated two  
  individuals as Rule 30(b)(6) deponents, Southern Union's  
  representatives traveled from Washington, D.C. to Dallas,  
  Texas, to conduct the depositions. Neither representative,  
  however, possessed any knowledge relevant to the matters  
  designated in the Rule 30(b)(6) notice. Consequently,  
  Southern Union moved for sanctions, and the district court  
  granted the motion, awarding costs and fees incurred in  
  deposing the RTC's two witnesses and in identifying  
  ultimately the proper deponent with knowledge of the  
  relevant facts. See id. at 196-97.  
    
 Relying upon the Court of Appeals for the Second  
  Circuit's opinion in Salahuddin, a case cited subsequently  
  in Welsh Foods, the RTC contended that sanctions  
  pursuant to Rule 37(d) were not appropriate because both  
  witnesses literally appeared for their depositions, albeit that  
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 neither was helpful or forthcoming with pertinent  
  information. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit  
  rejected that argument, reasoning:  
    
        Were we here faced with a case involving the deposition  
         of a natural person we might be inclined to agree with  
         the reading of Rule 37(d) by our Second Circuit  
         colleagues [in Salahuddin]. The deposition of a  
         corporation, however, poses a different problem, as  
         reflected by Rule 30(b)(6). Rule 30(b)(6) streamlines the  
         discovery process. It places the burden of identifying  
         responsive witnesses for a corporation on the  
         corporation. Obviously, this presents a potential for  
         abuse which is not extant where the party noticing the  
         deposition specifies the deponent. When a corporation  
         or association designates a person to testify on its  
         behalf, the corporation appears vicariously through  
         that agent. If that agent is not knowledgeable about  
         relevant facts, and the principal has failed to designate  
         an available, knowledgeable, and readily identifiable  
         witness, then the appearance is, for all practical  
         purposes, no appearance at all.  
    
         In the instant case, RTC possessed documents that  
         clearly identified [the eventual deponent] as having  
         personal knowledge of the subject of the deposition.  
         RTC did not furnish those documents or designate  
         [that deponent] until after it had designated Perry and  
         Wieting, obliged Southern Union's counsel to travel  
         from Washington, D.C. to Dallas for a useless  
         deposition, and been served with Southern Union's  
         motion for sanctions. The finding that RTC did not  
         make a meaningful effort to acquit its duty to designate  
         an appropriate witness is manifest. The district court  
         did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees and costs  
         under Rule 37(d).  
    
 Id. at 197-98.  
    
 Following the reasoning in Southern Union, several courts  
  similarly have read the phrase "fails . . . to appear" in Rule  
  37(d) pragmatically in light of the purposes of Rule 30(b)(6)  
  and the parties' obligations thereunder. See, e.g., Starlight  
  Int'l Inc. v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 639 (D. Kan. 1999)  
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 ("Corporations, partnerships, and joint ventures have a  
  duty to make a conscientious, good-faith effort to designate  
  knowledgeable persons for Rule 30(b)(6) depositions and to  
  prepare them to fully and unevasively answer questions  
  about the designated subject matter."); The Bank of New  
  York v. Meridien Biao Bank Tanzania Ltd., 171 F.R.D. 135,  
  151 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (" `Producing an unprepared witness is  
  tantamount to a failure to appear.' ") (quoting United States  
  v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 363 (M.D.N.C. 1996)); Taylor,  
  166 F.R.D. at 363 ("[I]nadequate preparation of a Rule  
  30(b)(6) designee can be sanctioned based on the lack of  
  good faith, prejudice to the opposing side, and disruption of  
  the proceedings."); Zappia Middle East Constr. Co. v. The  
  Emirate of Abu Dhabi, No. 94-1942, 1995 WL 686715, at *8  
  (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1995) (agreeing with rule announced in  
  Southern Union that providing a wholly inadequate witness  
  may amount to non-appearance under Rule 30(b)(6), but  
  finding that sanctions were not warranted in the  
  circumstances of that case); Municipal Subdistrict, Northern  
  Colo. Water Conservancy District v. OXY USA, Inc. , 990 P.2d  
  701, 710 (Colo. 1999) (en banc) (following Southern Union,  
  985 F.2d at 197, and holding that trial court may issue  
  sanctions for failure to appear under Col. R. Civ. P. 37(d)--  
  the state's analogue to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)--when a  
  corporation designates a deponent who appears but is  
  unable to answer all the questions specified in the Col. R.  
  Civ. P. 30(b)(6) notice); see also, e.g., Turner v. Hudson  
  Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 78-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)  
  ("[A] party that fails to provide witnesses knowledgeable in  
  the areas requested in a Rule 30(b)(6) notice is likewise  
  subject to sanctions."); Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc.,  
  126 F.R.D. 522, 525 (N.D. Miss. 1989) ("Sanctions are  
  appropriate when a party fails to comply with a request  
  under Rule 30(b)(6) to provide a knowledgeable deponent to  
  testify on behalf of the organization."); see generally Boland  
  Marine & Mfg. Co. v. M/V Bright Field, No. 97-3097, 1999  
  WL 280451, at *3 (E.D. La. May 3, 1999) (acknowledging  
  the rule announced in Southern Union butfinding that  
  deponent was prepared adequately and that sanctions were  
  not warranted).  
    
 We agree with the distinction the Court of Appeals drew  
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 in Southern Union, and find its analysis persuasive.18 In  
  reality if a Rule 30(b)(6) witness is unable to give useful  
  information he is no more present for the deposition than  
  would be a deponent who physically appears for the  
  deposition but sleeps through it. Indeed, we believe that the  
  purpose behind Rule 30(b)(6) undoubtedly is frustrated in  
  the situation in which a corporate party produces a witness  
  who is unable and/or unwilling to provide the necessary  
  factual information on the entity's behalf. See generally  
  Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 advisory committee's notes (stating that  
  the procedure outlined in subdivision (b)(6) should be  
  viewed as "an added facility for discovery" and would "curb  
  the `bandying' by which officers or managing agents of a  
  corporation are deposed in turn but each disclaims  
  knowledge" of relevant facts). "For courts to permit litigants  
  to disregard the responsibilities that attend the conduct of  
  litigation would be tantamount to `encouraging dilatory  
  tactics.' " Al Barnett & Son, Inc., 611 F.2d at 35 (quoting  
  Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre v. Allied Artists Pictures  
  Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1068 (2d Cir. 1979)). Thus, we hold  
  that when a witness is designated by a corporate party to  
  speak on its behalf pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), "[p]roducing  
  an unprepared witness is tantamount to a failure to  
  appear" that is sanctionable under Rule 37(d). See Taylor,  
  166 F.R.D. at 363. Accordingly, we conclude that the  
  district court did not commit an error of law in affirming  
  the magistrate judge's sanctions order entered pursuant to  
  Rule 37(d), as the magistrate correctly applied the Court of  
  Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's construction, which we  
  _________________________________________________________________  
    
 18. We point out that the cases appellants cite in addition to Welsh  
  Foods in further support of their argument are equally unhelpful, as  
  none of them involved a situation in which the uncooperative and/or  
  unknowledgeable witness was a corporate entity's Rule 30(b)(6) designee.  
  See, e.g., Estrada v. Rowland, 69 F.3d 405, 405-06 (9th Cir. 1995)  
  (deponent was plaintiff pursuing action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983  
  against prison officials); Aziz v. Wright, 34 F.3d 587, 588-89 (8th Cir.  
  1994) (same); Salahuddin, 782 F.2d at 1131 (same); Stevens v.  
  Greyhound Lines, Inc., 710 F.2d 1224, 1228 (7th Cir. 1983) (deponent  
  was plaintiff in employment discrimination suit); SEC v. Research  
  Automation Corp., 521 F.2d 585, 587 (2d Cir. 1975) (deponent was  
  individual defendant and president of corporate defendant).  
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 approve, of the phrase "fails . . . to appear" in Southern  
  Union.  
    
 We reject appellants' final contention that Berger's  
  responses during his deposition did not support the district  
  court's finding that he failed to cooperate with appellees'  
  attorneys, and that his conduct was tantamount to a  
  failure to appear that warranted sanctions under Rule  
  37(d). To the contrary, our review of Berger's deposition  
  testimony in its entirety confirms the observations of both  
  the magistrate judge and the district court on this point.  
  Indeed, throughout his lengthy deposition, Berger failed to  
  offer meaningful testimony about most, if not all, of the  
  items specified in the notice of deposition. While we need  
  not recite every instance in which Berger's testimony was  
  incomplete and unhelpful on the specified topics, we believe  
  that two examples of his uncooperative attitude and his  
  flagrant disregard for his obligation as a Rule 30(b)(6)  
  witness amply illustrate our point.  
    
 First, when Berger was asked about the Agreement he  
  signed between USLR and Essex, he stated that he had no  
  recollection of (1) seeing or signing the Agreement, (2)  
  negotiating the Agreement (or who participated in its  
  negotiation), (3) drafting the various provisions in the  
  Agreement (or who participated in its drafting), or (4) the  
  circumstances surrounding the purchase of the Property,  
  i.e., if he attended the closing and where it occurred, even  
  though he admitted that he was personally involved in the  
  purchase of the Property and "probably negotiated the  
  contract." See app. at 525a. Second, when asked about any  
  and all cleanup costs appellants' incurred as a result of the  
  contamination on the Property, Berger testified that he did  
  not know: (1) whether appellants spent any money to  
  cleanup hazardous waste; (2) whether appellants performed  
  any environmental evaluation or investigation on the  
  Property, whether they incurred costs in doing so, and  
  whether there are any records that such tests were  
  performed; (3) whether appellants hired ESI to perform  
  consulting services for the Property, and if so, the dates  
  and purposes for which appellants retained ESI; (4)  
  whether ESI's billing statements in the record reflected  
  work performed on the Property or other unrelated services;  
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 and (5) whether appellants performed any removal or  
  remedial actions on the Property. App. at 521a, 523-25a,  
  544a-49a.  
    
 Obviously, as appellants' Rule 30(b)(6) witness, Berger  
  should have been prepared to discuss these and other  
  topics designated in the notice of deposition. Instead, he  
  divulged as little information as possible in every area that  
  appellees identified. Moreover, Berger's uncooperative  
  attitude is demonstrated further by statements in which he  
  claimed that he was unaware that he was appellants'  
  designated Rule 30(b)(6) representative, did not know what  
  the phrase "Rule 30(b)(6) representative" meant, and was  
  not familiar with Rule 30(b)(6) or what it required him to  
  do. App. at 513a-14a, 527a, 544a. He also admitted at one  
  point that he did not recall whether he reviewed the notice  
  of deposition prior to the date of the deposition, app. at  
  527a, and later stated clearly that he had not bothered to  
  read it at all. App. at 610. Simply put, we find his professed  
  ignorance on these points particularly unconvincing given  
  that he obtained undergraduate and law degrees from  
  prestigious universities and has been licensed to practice  
  law since "either [19]65 or [19]66." App. at 508a.  
    
 In any event, we believe that the magistrate judge's  
  finding that Berger engaged in discovery abuses plainly is  
  justified on this record. The magistrate judge had ample  
  evidence of Berger's failure to cooperate, which in turn  
  rendered his deposition a virtual non-event. Accordingly, we  
  will affirm the monetary sanctions ordered pursuant to  
  Rule 37(d).  
    
 IV. CONCLUSION  
    
 For the foregoing reasons, the district court's orders of  
  August 10, 1999, and December 16, 1999, will be affirmed.  
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